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DOSTOYEVSKY AND THE THERAPEUTIC
JURISPRUDENCE CONFESSION
AMY

D. RONNER*

In Fyodor Dostoyevsky's Crime and Punishment,' Rodion
Raskolnikov murders an old woman, a moneylender:
At that point, with all his might, he landed her another blow, and
another, each time with the butt and each time on the crown of the
head. The blood gushed out as from an upturned glass, and her
body collapsed backwards. He stepped back, allowed her to fall and
at once bent down over her face: she was dead. Her eyes were
goggling out of her head as though they might burst from it, while
her forehead and all the rest of her features were crumpled and
distorted in a convulsive spasm.

When the victim's step-sister unexpectedly intrudes, Raskolnikov
again wielding his axe, makes it a double murder and absconds
with the valuables. About twelve days later, Raskolnikov turns
himself in and confesses to the police. Raskolnikov is tried,
convicted, and sentenced to eight years of penal servitude in
Siberia.
I.

INTRODUCTION

Crime and Punishment, one of the great classics of world
literature, takes place in St. Petersberg, Russia in the summer of
1865, a time in which the country's legal system was undergoing
reform.3 It was also a time in Dostoyevsky's life when he could
Professor of Law, St. Thomas University School of Law.
J.D., 1985,
University of Miami; Ph.D. (English Language and Literature), 1980,
University of Michigan; M.A., 1976, University of Michigan; B.A., 1975, Beloit
College. Before becoming a lawyer, I taught literature at the University of
Michigan and University of Miami. I would like to dedicate this article to
Monsignor Andrew Anderson, who has been so supportive of my teaching,
scholarship, and my academic freedom for so many years. I also wish to thank
my research assistant, Elizabeth Matherne, along with law library guru, Ned
Swanner, for their invaluable help with this article.
1. FYODOR DOsToYEvsKY, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT (David McDuff ed.,
Penguin Books 2003) (1866).
2. Id. at 94-95.
3. See generally William Burnham, The Legal Context and Contributions
of Dostoyevsky's Crime and Punishment, 100 MICH. L. REV. 1227 (2002)
(describing the legal changes taking place in the 1860s in Russia).
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reflect on his own experience with Russian criminal justice.4 In
1849, already a known novelist, Dostoyevsky had been arrested,
tried, and sentenced to death for treason.'
After about eight
months in prison, officials paraded him and others into a public
square and tethered them to execution posts before a firing squad.
Just before discharging their fatal shots, the soldiers received a
command to halt. Thus, by order of Nicholas I, the great Russian
novelist and fellow prisoners were spared and their death
sentences were commuted to terms of hard labor and exile in
Siberia.
After serving his full sentence, Dostoyevksy was
permitted to return to St. Petersberg and then wrote Crime and
Punishment between 1864 and 1866, in the wake of his traumatic
ordeal.6
Although Dostoyevsky was not a lawyer and lacked formal
legal training, he undeniably had a unique insight into not just the
law and the workings of criminal justice, but also into the psyches
of people that commit crimes.7 Like other literary masterpieces,
Crime and Punishment transcends time, place, and even subject
matter. Although the story takes place in mid-nineteenth century

4. Id. at 1228; see also JOSEPH FRANK, DOSTOYEVSKY: THE MIRACULOUS
YEARS, 1865-1871 IV (1995) (covering years during which Dostoyevsky wrote
CRIME AND PUNISHMENT and THE GAMBLER).
5. Burnham, supra note 3, at 1228; see also FYODOR DOSTOYEvSKY, THE
HOUSE OF THE DEAD (Penguin Books 2003) (1861) (describing prison life in
Siberia based on personal experience).
6. See Burnham, supra note 3, at 1227 n.2; see also FRANK, supra note 4.
In Dostoyevsky's THE IDIOT, Prince Myshkin describes "a man ...once taken
up with others to the scaffold, and the death sentence by firing squad was read
out to him, for a political offence" and "[slome twenty minutes later a reprieve
was read out to him, and a different degree of punishment was fixed, but in
the interval between the two sentences, twenty minutes, or at least quarter of
an hour, he lived in the unquestionable conviction that in a few minutes time
he would face sudden death."
FYODOR DOSTOYEVSKY, THE IDIOT 70-71
(Penguin Books 2004) (1868).
7. See David McDuff, Translator's Introduction, in THE HOUSE OF THE
DEAD, supra note 5, at 7 ("I had got to know something of the convict
population back in Tobolsk; here in Omsk I was to live for four years in close
proximity to it. These men were coarse, irritable and malicious." (quoting
Dostoyevsky's letter to his brother Mikhail, written right after his release
from prison in Omsk, Western Siberia)); Burnham, supra note 3, at 1228-29
("[Tihe experience in Siberia threw Dostoyevsky together for several years
with a wide variety of ordinary and political offenders. This experience
undoubtedly informed him well and piqued his curiosity about the nature of
both crime and its punishment."); see also A Criminal Reviews a Book,
SATURDAY EVENING POST, Nov. 24, 1962, at 78 ("Dostoyevsky succeeds in
revealing the real cost of crime .... Almost every criminal will recognize
himself in Raskolnikov, and I wonder if it wouldn't be a real deterrent to a
potential thief to read and reread pertinent passages from Dostoyevski's
book .... [T]he work should be required reading for every person who
undertakes to study or do anything about the criminals in our society.").
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Russia, its enduring wisdom applies to contemporary American
jurisprudence and conveys timeless truths about human nature.
Dostoyevsky's novel has in fact attracted multiple
interdisciplinary scholars that have practically analyzed Crime
and Punishment to death, and done so from diverse perspectives.8
In fact, this novel, perhaps more than any other in world
literature, has amassed a practical cult of scholars trying to parse
Dostoyevsky's definition of the meaning of human existence and
analyze the author's moral attitude toward his complex and
disturbing protagonist, whose crime is ostensibly nihilistic and
inexplicable.
THE AUTHOR
AS
8. See e.g., LOUIS BREGER, DOSTOYEVSKY:
PSYCHOANALYST 25 (1989) (conducting a psychoanalysis of Raskolnikov,
whose crime, "like the creation of a bad mother in the landlady, is an attempt
to externalize his overwhelming ambivalence so that he can take action in the
world."); FRANK, supra note 4 (helping readers understand the novel by
focusing on the writer's personal life and the social, cultural, literary and
philosophical background of the times.); RICHARD H. WEISBERG, THE FAILURE
OF THE WORD 54 (1984) (focusing primarily on Porfiry Petrovich, lawyer and
officer of the court, who "plays a game of life and death within the context of a
perfectly respectable professional position."); I. Atkin, Raskolnikov; The Study
of A Criminal, 5 J. OF CRIMINAL PSYCHOPATHOLOGY 255 (1943) (analyzing
Raskolnikov "as a living being who is at odds with his environment" and
discussing the "social determinants of crime"); Vera Bergelson, Crimes and
Defenses of Rodion Raskolnikov, 85 KY. L.J. 919, 921 (1996-97) (attempting "to
read Crime and Punishment and the Model Penal Code together, conducting a
hypothetical 'retrial' of Rodion Raskolnikov."); Burnham, supra note 3
(analyzing the novel through examination of the legal system and the rules of
evidence existing at the time); Margaret Church, Dostoyevsky's "Crime and
Punishment"and Kafka's "The Trial", 19 LITERATURE AND PSYCHOL. 47 (1969)
(analyzing the parallels between Crime and Punishment and Kafka's The
Trial); Hugh Mercer Curtler, The Artistic Failure of Crime and Punishment,
38.1 J. OF AESTHETIC EDUC. 1 (arguing that Raskolnikov's freedom is an
"artistic failure"); Jeanne Gaakeer, "The Art to Find the Mind's Construction
In the Face," Lombroso's Criminal Anthology and Literature: The Example of
Zola, Dostoyevsky, and Tolstoy, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 2345, 2346 (2005)
(examining Cesare Lombroso's view that Dostoyevsky "was a criminal
anthropologist who, in the character of Raskolnikov ... depicted a fine
specimen of the occasional criminal"); Kathleen Donnellan Garber, A
PsychologicalAnalysis of a Dostoyevsky Character:Raskolnikov's Struggle for
Survival 14 PERSPECTIVES IN PSYCHIATRIC CARE 16 (1976) (focusing on "the
psychological disintegration of Raskolnikov" before and after the crime);
Jeffrey C. Hutzler, Family Pathology in Crime and Punishment, 38 AM. J. OF
PSYCHOANALYSIS 335, 335 (1978) (suggesting that "the concept of family
pathology explains Raskolnikov's odd symptoms (diagnosis), his motivation for
the murders he committed (dynamic) and the resolution of his conflict"); David
Kiremidjian, Crime and Punishment: Matricide and the Woman Question, 33
Am. IMAGO 403 (1976) (analyzing Raskolnikov's infantile dependencies and his
matricidal impulses); Peter Lowe, Prufrock in St. Petersburg: The Presence of
Dostoyevsky's CRIME AND PUNISHMENT in T.S. Eliot's "The Love Song of J.
Alfred Prufrock", 28 J. OF MODERN LITERATURE 1 (2005) (describing how T.S.
Eliot borrowed from Raskolnikov in composing his best known modernist
poem, "The Love Song of J. Alfred Prufrock).
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This article acknowledges that while Crime and Punishment
entails a brutal murder of two women, the real focus is not on the
crime itself, but on its aftermath, on Raskolnikov's psychological
anguish, and on what eventually preempts all else - the
murderer's need, or rather obsessive compulsion, to confess.
Raskolnikov probably could have escaped detection and gotten
away with murder; but it is Raskolnikov himself who sabotages
that possibility. There is something that propels Raskolnikov to
do himself in, re-visit the crime scene, make incriminating
insinuations to a police clerk in a bar, and bring himself to the
attention of and even tease Porfiry Petrovich, who is the
formidable examining magistrate assigned to the case.
Crime and Punishment is not really about crime or even
punishment per se. Its veritable subject is one human being's
overwhelming need to come clean and transform himself. The
novel, however, is not just an expos6 of the subliminal forces that
propel a criminal to accept responsibility for a heinous act. This
great Russian novel is a veritable testimonial to confession as a
celebrated event, as the prime catalyst for deep moral, spiritual,
and psychological regeneration.'
This article broadly proposes that Dostoyevksy's Crime and
Punishment sheds light on something that has always troubled the
United States Supreme Court and vexed criminal justice scholars
- namely, confessions. In fact, a substantial component of just
about any criminal procedure curriculum is devoted to the due
process cases predating Miranda v. Arizona,0 and the United
States Supreme Court's quest for ways to regulate police
extractions of incriminating statements from suspects."
A
thorough study of criminal procedure will also at least entail a
close look at confessions in connection with the Fifth Amendment
privilege against self-incrimination and the Sixth Amendment
right to counsel.

9. Robert F. Cochran, Crime, Confession, And The Counselor-At-Law:
Lessons From Dostoyevsky, 35 Hous. L. REV. 327, 365-66 (1998) ("Though

Dostoyevsky's characters emphasize the psychological and rational effects of
confession, some of his characters [like those in CRIME AND PUNISHMENT]
recognize eternal implications."); Douglas Robbins, Resurrection From a Death
Sentence: Why Capital Sentences Should Be Commuted upon the Occasion of
an Authentic Ethical Transformation, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1115, 1161 (2001)
(arguing that after confession and punishment "a new man is born with a
moral outlook entirely foreign to his former self").
10. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
11. See generally JAMES J. TOMKOVICZ & WELSH S. WHITE, CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE: CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRAINTS UPON INVESTIGATION AND PROOF

(2004). The author of this article teaches Criminal Procedure and uses that
fine text book, and especially appreciates its coverage of confession and selfincrimination.
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This article, divided into five parts, will place Dostoyevsky's
thesis in Crime and Punishment in the context of criminal
confession jurisprudence. It will show how the novel is a valuable
tool that can shed light on confessions and give criminal defense
attorneys a fresh perspective on them.
Part II begins with therapeutic jurisprudence, which is a
relatively new field of legal study that already has had an impact
on the courts and on nearly all areas of the law. 2 The basic
premise of therapeutic jurisprudence is that the law often
"function[s] as a kind of therapist or therapeutic agent" and that
"legal procedures .. . constitute social forces that, whether
intended or not, often produce therapeutic or antitherapeutic
consequences."" Some criminal defense lawyers have welcomed
therapeutic jurisprudence into their practice and have
implemented a more holistic approach to their clients, one that
aims to foster individual well being and healing.1 4 Therapeutic
jurisprudence can also discredit to some extent the attitude of the
traditional criminal defense bar toward client confessions and
suggest that in certain instances, they might be welcomed, or at
least, not squelched.

12. See generally LAW IN A THERAPEUTIC

KEY:

DEVELOPMENTS

IN

THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE (David B. Wexler & Bruce J. Winick eds., 1996)
(an anthology of therapeutic jurisprudence articles in a variety of legal areas);
ESSAYS IN THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE (David B. Wexler & Bruce J. Winick

eds., 1991) (applying therapeutic jurisprudence to various issues in mental
health

law); BRUCE J.

WINICK, THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE

APPLIED:

ESSAYS ON MENTAL HEALTH LAW (Bruce J. Winick ed., 1997) (showing how
therapeutic jurisprudence can help us understand and restructure mental
health law); Special Issue on TherapeuticJurisprudence,37 COURT REV. 1, 168 (2000) (collection of articles on how therapeutic jurisprudence can affect the
courts and judicial decisions); Peggy Fulton Hora, et al., Therapeutic
Jurisprudenceand the Drug Treatment Court Movement: Revolutionizing the
Criminal Justice System's Response to Drug Abuse and Crime in America, 74
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 439 (1999) (applying therapeutic jurisprudence to
criminal justice); Amy D. Ronner & Bruce J. Winick, Silencing the Appellant's
Voice: The Antitherapeutic Per CuriamAffirmance, 24 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 499
(2000) (applying therapeutic jurisprudence to appellate practice); The
Honorable Juan Ramirez, Jr. & Amy D. Ronner, Voiceless Billy Budd:
Melville's Tribute To The Sixth Amendment, 41 CAL. WESTERN L. REV. 103
(2004) (showing how therapeutic jurisprudence can add a dimension to law
and literature and help us understand Melville's novella); Amy D. Ronner,
Songs of Validation, Voice and Voluntary Participation: Therapeutic
Jurisprudence,Miranda and Juveniles, 71 U. CIN. L. REV. 89 (2002) (applying
therapeutic jurisprudence to juvenile justice).
13. Bruce J. Winick, The Jurisprudence of Therapeutic Jurisprudence, 3
PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 184, 185 (1997).
14. See generally David B. Wexler, Therapeutic Jurisprudence And the
Rehabilitative Role of the Criminal Defense Lawyer, 17 ST. THOMAS L. REV.
743 (2005) (exploring how criminal defense lawyers can integrate therapeutic
jurisprudence into their practice).
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Part III makes a seeming detour into a brief re-examination
of the history of confession jurisprudence, beginning with the pre1964 concerns that prompted the United States Supreme Court to
determine when and how certain incriminating statements
The article revisits later
violated the Due Process Clause.
developments during the mid-1960s, in which the Court held that
both the Fifth Amendment and the Sixth Amendment governed
the constitutional admissibility of confessions. The article here
will explore the Court's attempt to control what it viewed as "the
potential evils of incommunicado interrogation" and most
importantly, link this with voluntariness and fairness, concepts
that also comprise the very fundament of therapeutic
jurisprudence.' 5
Part IV is a study of Raskolnikov before, during, and after the
commission of the crime. It shows how Dostoyevsky's anguished
protagonist is consumed with the need to confess, a condition even
predating his serious contemplation of the crime. In essence,
Dostoyevsky gives us a psychological portrait of someone, who,
although a unique human being, is also a species of offender, the
kind that craves confession, acceptance of responsibility, and
ultimate transformation. He is the sort that can benefit from
therapeutic jurisprudence.
Part V presents a new angle on law and literature. 16 It
engages in a therapeutic jurisprudence analysis of Dostoyevsky's
Crime and Punishment, further exploring Raskolnikov's
compulsion to confess. In this context, the article will delve into
the significance of confession, which is not just a putative
prosecutorial tool for closing a crime file, but is and can be the very
catalyst to healing and rehabilitation. This part will also analyze
other characters in Raskolnikov's world and show how they serve
as therapeutic agents facilitating a slow but meaningful
redemptive process. It is here that the article will once again
bring in therapeutic jurisprudence and landmark Supreme Court
confession cases, emphasizing that they and Dostoyevsky are not
at odds, but share some of the same vital concerns.
Part VI of this article will essentially conclude where it began
by revisiting Raskolnikov's seemingly senseless murder and
suggest that therapeutic jurisprudence can help us make sense out
of that brutal crime. The conclusion further aspires to extract
from Dostoyevsky a message that can assist and even elevate
therapeutic criminal justice.

15. Geoffrey R. Stone, The Miranda Doctrine in the Burger Court, 1977 SUP.
CT. REV. 102-3 (1967) (quoting WALTER V. SCHAEFER, THE SUSPECT AND
SOCIETY 10 (1967)).
16. See Ramirez & Ronner, Voiceless Billy Budd, supra note 12 (attempting
a therapeutic jurisprudence analysis of Melville's novella).
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THERAPEUTIC CONFESSIONS: VOLUNTARINESS AND FAIRNESS

The founders of therapeutic jurisprudence, Professors Winick
and Wexler, trace the origin of their interdisciplinary movement to
mental health law.1" Pioneering scholars criticized aspects of
mental health law, which they saw as spawning antitherapeutic
results for the very people that it aimed to help. 8
Later
therapeutic jurisprudence spread to other contexts, like criminal,
juvenile, and personal injury law.19 It is now a full-fledged
approach to all areas of the law and has its own well-respected
body of literature. This article will show that it also coexists quite
nicely with another interdisciplinary niche - law and literature.0
A. The Foundation of TherapeuticJurisprudence
In a book advancing the application of therapeutic
jurisprudence to the enterprise of judging, Professors Winick and
Wexler, explain:
Therapeutic jurisprudence focuses our attention on the traditionally
under-appreciated area of the law's considerable impact on
emotional life and psychological well-being. Its essential premise is
a simple one: that the law is a social force that can produce
therapeutic or antitherapeutic consequences. The law consists of
legal rules, legal procedures, and roles and behaviors of legal actors,
like lawyers and judges. Therapeutic jurisprudence proposes that
we use the tools of the behavioral sciences to study the therapeutic
and antitherapeutic impact of the law, and that we think creatively
about improving the therapeutic functioning of the law without
violating other important values.
2
All areas of law that have imbibed therapeutic jurisprudence,
along with criminal justice, share a core philosophy. That is, there
are basic common-sense truths undergirding any process or
lawyering movement that cares about healing and the promotion
of individual well-being. For example, an individual's sense of
voluntary participation in what is experienced as a fair procedure

17. BRUCE J. WINICK & DAVID B. WEXLER, JUDGING IN A THERAPEUTIC KEY:
THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE AND THE COURTS 7 (2003).

18. Id.
19. Id. ("[Tiherapeutic jurisprudence soon found easy application to other
areas of the law - criminal law, juvenile law, family law, personal injury law
and has now emerged as a therapeutic approach to the law generally"); see
also supra note 12 (providing examples of the expansiveness and diversity of
therapeutic jurisprudence scholarship).

20. See also Ramirez & Ronner, Voiceless Billy Budd, supra note 12, at 108
(explaining that the article "hone[s] in on what is Melville's core message and
advocate[s]

more

broadly

how

[therapeutic

jurisprudence]

and

certain

literature can be a profound contributor to legal education and to our justice
system").

21. WINICK & WEXLER, supra note 17, at 7.
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is the heart and soul of all therapeutic jurisprudence scholarship
and its practical applications."
Therapeutic jurisprudence scholars point out that when
individuals participate in a judicial process, what influences them
the most is not the result, but their assessment of the fairness of
the process itself.2 3 Professor Tom Tyler, a social psychologist and
a main proponent of the psychology of procedural justice,
elaborates:
Studies suggest that if the socializing influence of experience is the
issue of concern (i.e., the impact of participating in a judicial
hearing on a person's respect for the law and legal authorities), then
the primary influence is the person's evaluation of the fairness of
the judicial procedure itself, not their evaluations of the outcome.
Such respect is important because it has been found to influence
everyday behavior toward the law. When people believe that legal
authorities are less legitimate, they are less likely to be law-abiding
citizens in their everyday lives.24
Professor Gould, dealing with similar concepts in criminal
sentencing, has concluded that those who "experienced a legal
procedure that they judged to be unfair ...had less respect for the
law and legal authorities and are less likely to accept judicial
decisions."2 ' The problem is that such feelings can impede an
individual's rehabilitation and "lead to a gradual erosion of
obedience to the law."' In contrast, when individuals see the legal
system as fair and feel that they have been treated with respect
and dignity, the effect is bound to be therapeutic. Participants in
such a process tend to be more inclined to accept responsibility for
their own conduct, take charge, and change.27 Of course, all of this
22. See Tom R. Tyler, The Psychological Consequences of Judicial
Procedures:Implicationsfor Civil Commitment Hearings, 46 SMU L. REV. 433,

437 (1992) (focusing on the psychological consequences of commitment
hearings); see also Amy D. Ronner, Punishment Meted Out for Acquittals: An
Antitherapeutic Atrocity, 41 ARIz. L. REV. 459, 472-77 (1999) (discussing how

unfair procedures engender disrespect for the law, disregard for human life,
rage, and a sense of helplessness); Ronner & Winick, supra note 12, at 501-03
(discussing how proceedings that instill a greater respect for the law provide
litigants with incentive to move forward and improve their own situation).
23. See Ronner, Songs of Validation, Voice and Voluntary Participation,

supra note 12, at 93-96 (discussing 'the three V's: namely, a sense of voice,
validation, and voluntary participation").
24. See Tyler, supra note 22, at 437.
25. Keri A. Gould, Turning Rat and Doing Time for Uncharged, Dismissed
or Acquitted Crimes: Do the FederalSentencing Guidelines Promote Respect for
the Law?, 10 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HuM. RTS. 835, 865 (1993); see also Ronner, supra
note 22, at 474 (pointing out the negative effects of unfair legal procedures).

26. Gould, supra note 25, at 865 (quoting Daniel W. Shuman & Jean A.
Hamilton, Jury Service - It May Change Your Mind: Perceptionsof Fairness
of Jurors and Nonjurors, 46 SMU L. REV. 449, 451 (1992).
27. See, e.g., E. ALLEN LIND & TOM R. TYPLER, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF
PROCEDURAL JUSTICE (1988); JOHN THIBAULT & LAURENS WALKER,
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is not just confined to the one individual that happens to be
interacting with the legal system, but spreads to society at large,
instilling public confidence in the laws, attorneys, and courts.
Listening skills, so intermeshed with fairness, is something
For
that therapeutic jurisprudence praises and cultivates.
example, Professor Nathalie Des Rosier, who has done remarkable
work in appellate therapeutic jurisprudence, has emphasized "the
need for the tribunal to listen fully to all the concerns of the
participants and to recognize the value of such expression."28
According to Des Rosier, it is essential that parties know that they
have a voice and that it is not being silenced.
Akin to voice is the concept of validation. 30 When individuals
believe they have been genuinely listened to, heard, and taken
Consequently, when litigants
seriously, they feel validated.
emerge from a legal proceeding with a sense of voice and
validation, they are more accepting of the outcome. 3' Voice and
validation foster something essential - a sense of voluntary
participation - which occurs when an individual experiences the
proceedings as less coercive. 2 When individuals feel that they

PROCEDURAL JUSTICE: A PSYCHOLOGICAL ANALYSIS 83-84, 94-95, 118 (1975);
TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW (1990); E. Allen Lind et al., Voice,
Control and Procedural Justice: Instrumental Concerns in Fairness
Judgments, 59 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 952 (1990). For application
of these principles to civil commitment hearings, see generally Tyler, supra
note 22 (focusing on the psychological processes of commitment hearings);
Bruce J. Winick, Therapeutic Jurisprudence and the Civil Commitment
Hearing, 10 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 37, 46-47 (1999) (discussing such
principles and the role of counsel in civil commitment hearings).
28. Nathalie Des Rosiers, From Telling to Listening: A TherapeuticAnalysis
of the Rule of Courts in Minority-Majority Conflicts, 37 COURT REVIEW 54, 56
(2000); see also Ronner & Winick, supra note 12, at 501 ("Equal with voice is
'validation,' or the feeling that the tribunal has really listened to, heard, and
taken seriously the litigants' stories."); see also Bruce J. Winick, Coercion and
Mental Health Treatment, 74 DENV. U.L. REV. 1145, 1158 (1997) (discussing
coerced mental health treatment).
29. Nathalie Des Rosier, supra note 28, at 57.
30. See Ronner & Winick, supra note 12, at 501 (explaining the feeling
"that the tribunal has really listened to, heard, and taken seriously the
litigants' stories"); see also Bruce J. Winick, supra note 28, at 1158
(demonstrating the direct correlation between voice and validation).
31. Winick, supra note 27, at 48.
32. Id. Recent work by the MacArthur Network on Mental Health and the
Law on patient perceptions of coercion have found that even in coercive
situations like civil commitment, people do not feel coerced when they see the
state actors as benevolent and when they are treated with dignity and respect.
Id. at 47-50.
THERAPEUTIC

See generally BRUCE J. WINICK, CIVIL COMMITMENT: A
JURISPRUDENCE MODEL 149-54 (2005) (discussing the

"psychological effects of coercion and voluntary choice"); Nancy S. Bennett et
al., Inclusion, Motivation and Good Faith:The Morality of Coercion in Mental
Hospital Admission, 11 BEHAV. Sci & L. 295 (1993) (providing patient
accounts of the morality of mental hospital admissions); William Gardner et
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voluntarily partake in a process that engenders a result or a
judicial pronunciation that affects their own lives, they tend to
heal better and even ameliorate their behavior patterns. In
general, human beings flourish when they are making, or at least
participating in, their own decisions.'
In therapeutic jurisprudence, the attorney is key - it is he or
she who can help give clients that sense of voice, validation, and
voluntary participation. 4 It is the attorney that can help effectuate
the client's participatory interests and implement ways of making
proceedings seem fair and less coercive.
Further, where
appropriate, such attorneys can and should encourage certain
clients to accept responsibility for their own actions.'
Such
acceptance can be both the trigger for and the crowning
achievement of a true healing process.
Principles of therapeutic jurisprudence are now operating in
many areas of criminal justice and can boast of positive results. In
fact, some criminal defense attorneys have already embraced this
movement with its emphasis on the "emotional life and

al., Two Scales for Measuring Patients'Pereptionsfor Coercion DuringMental
Hospital Admission, 11 BEHAV. Sci. & L. 295, 307 (1993) (presenting patient
experiences with coercion in mental hospital admissions); Steven K Hoge et
al., Perceptions of Coercion in the Admission of Voluntary and Involuntary
Psychiatric Patients, 20 INT'L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 167 (1997) (examining the
role of coercion in hospital admissions processes); Charles W. Lidz et al.,
Perceived Coercion in Mental Hospital Admission: Pressures and Process, 52
ARCHIVE GEN. PSYCHIATRY 1034 (1995); John Monahan et al., Coercion and
Commitment: Understanding Involuntary Mental Hospital Admission, 18
INT'L J. L. & PSYCHIATRY 249 (1995) (exploring the relationship between
coerced admission and justice); John Monhan et al, Coercion to Inpatient
Treatment: Initial Results and Implications for Assertive Treatment in the
Community, in COERCION AND AGGRESSIVE COMMUNITY TREATMENT: A NEW
FRONTIER IN MENTAL HEALTH LAW 1, 13 (Deborah L. Dennis & John

Monahan eds., 1996) (discussing perceived coercion and legal status); see also
Winick, supra note 28, at 1158-59 (describing the MacArthur coercion study
and patient variables correlated with perception of coercion).
33. See generally BRUCE J. WINICK, THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE
APPLIED: ESSAYS ON MENTAL HEALTH LAWS 68-83 (1977) (exploring the

expansion of therapeutic jurisprudence and its importance); Ronner & Winick,
supra note 12, at 502 (describing the importance of voluntariness in the legal
process); Bruce J. Winick, On Autonomy: Legal and PsychologicalPerspectives,
37 VILL. L. REV. 1705, 1755-68 (1992) (pointing to the psychological value of
choice).
34. See Ramirez & Ronner, supra note 12, at 121 ("It is the attorney who
can help effectuate such individuals' participatory interests and give them
voice and validation. It is also the attorney as the voice that can make legal
proceedings seem less coercive and increase the likelihood that the results will
be perceived as fair."); Ronner & Winick, supra note 12, at 502 ("On appeal, as
in the trial itself, the lawyer typically functions as the instrument of the
client's voice.").
35. See generally Wexler, supra note 14 (discussing the importance of
acceptance of responsibility to the offender on the road to rehabilitation).
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psychological well-being" by turning to behavioral science tools to
facilitate what they accept as a legitimate goal - a therapeutic
legal process." One such place is the drug treatment court, which,
aiming to halt the vicious cycle of addiction and crime, provides a
drug addicted individual with court-monitored help. According to
Martin Reisig, a former drug-court defense attorney, therapeutic
jurisprudence is compatible with criminal defense work as long as
there exists a balance between the goals of due process and
healing.37 Here Reisig stresses the importance of voluntary participation in a fair process:
The overall well-being of the individual is of paramount value. The
potential outcome is so good that it is easy to forget the setting.
When the setting includes a guilty plea and a felony as the cost of
admission to a drug treatment court the process becomes as
important as the potential outcome. A defendant must fully
participate in the decision to enter a drug treatment court, trust
that he has been provided with full information and perceive that
his views have been fully heard. The therapeutic or antitherapeutic
aspects of the process deserve attention, so as not to undermine the
potential good of drug treatment courts.3
What Reisig proposes is that without voice, validation, and
voluntary participation, the drug treatment courts, even with their
laudable objectives, can backfire and do harm. For him, these
courts
can only work through "caring and thorough
representation."39
There are lawyers that have
taken therapeutic
jurisprudence beyond the contours of problem solving courts and
have built an actual therapeutic jurisprudence criminal law
practice." For example, Dallas, Texas attorney, John McShane,
once observed that with respect to habitual driving under the
influence offenders, alcoholism is a disease that can spawn
redundant arrests.4' McShane's law firm, aiming to treat not just
the symptoms, but the disease itself, refuses to represent
defendants battling alcoholism unless they sign a contract

36. WINICK & WEXLER, supra note 17, at 7.
37. See Martin Reisig, The Difficult Role of the Defense Lawyer in a PostAdjudication Drug Treatment Court: Accommodating Therapeutic
Jurisprudence and Due Process, 38 CRIM L. BULL. 216 (2002) (discussing
therapeutic jurisprudence along with Due Process).
38. Id. at 223.
39. Id. at 224.
40. See generally David B. Wexler, supra note 14 (discussing how
therapeutic jurisprudence has been applied to criminal defense practice).
41. Id. at 744-45 (discussing JOHN V. MCSHANE, THE How AND WHY OF
THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE IN CRIMINAL DEFENSE WORK (2000)). This
article's author has participated in numerous speaking engagements with
therapeutic jurisprudence lawyer John McShane and bases some of the
information in this article on what she learned from those conferences.
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agreeing to a therapeutic jurisprudence plan."2 If a potential client
declines, the firm makes a referral to a competent lawyer who will
then represent that client in the traditional way.' The same kind
of referral is made when such a defendant has a viable defense."
In short, McShane's modus operandi is tailored to a certain kind of
repeat offender that wants help and chooses to change.
Once the therapeutic jurisprudence contract is executed,
however, the case centers on rehabilitation plus mitigation of
punishment. 5 In this practice, the client, owning up to his or her
evaluation, treatment, and a relapse
problem, consents to
prevention program.' McShane then defers the disposition of the
case to give the client maximum recovery time and assembles a
packet of information on the rehabilitation for the prosecutor at
plea bargaining, or the judge at the sentencing hearing.47 What is
key here is the client's voluntary participation and acceptance of
responsibility for his or her actions. For McShane's system to
work, clients must stop lying to themselves and others about their
problem and commit themselves to changing their lifestyles and
focusing on getting better.' Basically, they have to own up and
follow through.
Still other criminal lawyers, even ones with a more
traditional practice, have integrated therapeutic jurisprudence
tools into their work. In his superb article, Professor David
Wexler discusses the criminal defense lawyer's potential
rehabilitative role in multiple aspects or stages in the process.'
He explains that criminal lawyers can be effective agents of
positive behavioral change through "encouraging active and
meaningful client participation" and through "fostering client hope
and expectancy." 0
Wexler advises lawyers to educate themselves about
treatment programs available in their jurisdictions and be
knowledgeable of informal and formal programs for diversion.5
With respect to pleas and sentencing, a therapeutic jurisprudence
criminal lawyer should be adept at assembling a rehabilitationoriented packet to help secure a favorable plea arrangement or fair

42. Id. at 744.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 744-45.
48. Id.
49. Wexler, supra note 14.
50. Id. at 748; see also Michael D. Clark, A Change-Focused Approach for
Judges, in WINICK & WEXLER, supra note 17, at 137-47 (discussing such
factors and their efficacy in the context of drug court programs).
51. Wexler, supra note 14, at 749.
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sentence.2 In this regard, Wexler, borrowing from the McShane
prototype, suggests an effort to defer sentence and compile a
record of post-offense rehabilitation.53 He also underscores that
post-offense rehabilitation can lead to "[t]he sanction of probation,
[which] when legally available for a given offense, is chock-full of
Therapeutic Jurisprudence considerations, [and] ...can inform
and enrich the role of the defense counsel. " 4
According to Wexler, after conviction, and especially after a
jail sentence, there exist therapeutic jurisprudence opportunities
in the dialogue between lawyer and the client.55 If an appeal is
anticipated, there is also the possibility of conveying the
importance of voice and validation to an appellate tribunal that
might do something more productive than merely issue a per
curiam summary affirmance. 6 Further, when a client is facing
incarceration, the therapeutic jurisprudence lawyer and client can
discuss the sentence and the future.57 What Wexler here proposes
is that the rehabilitative involvement of the lawyer should
"extend[] beyond sentencing, into corrections, conditional or
unconditional release, and to life in the community."' His model,
both holistic and healing, invites a peaceful merger between
traditional and therapeutic approaches in criminal practice.
B. Therapeutic Jurisprudenceand Confession
Therapeutic jurisprudence can also shed light on the role of
confessions. But before venturing forth, it is an opportune time to
52. Id. at 753.
53. Id. at 753. According to Wexler, "[cilosely related to [pleas] is sentence
leniency, often given for a defendant's 'acceptance of responsibility,' which will
kick in more clearly if it occurs early in the process, and is perceived as
genuine rather than as purely strategic." Id. at 754 (citing United States v.
Jeter, 236 F.3d 1032 (9th Cir. 2001)).
54. Wexler, supra note 14, at 756-57; see also Faye S. Taxman & Meredith
H. Thanner, Probation From A Therapeutic Perspective: Results From the
Field, 7 CONTEMP. ISSUES IN L. 39 (2004) (arguing the importance of
community standards).
55. David B. Wexler, supra note 14, at 766-69.
56. Id. at 767 (discussing Ronner & Winick, supra note 12). A per curiam
affirmance, known as a PCA, occurs when the appellate court issues an order
that simply says one word - affirmed. See generally Ronner & Winick, supra
note 12, at 500-501 (analyzing "the antitherapeutic impact of the PCA... [by]
delving into the psychology of procedural justice..., [by] show[ing] how a
PCA had a negative psychological impact on an actual appellant in a criminal
case ...

,

[and] by proposing an alternative to the antitherapeutic PCA."); see

also Amy D. Ronner, Therapeutic Jurisprudence On Appeal, 37 CT. REV. 64,
64-66 (2000) (discussing how an "appellate court served as a therapist for a
client represented by a law school in-house appellate litigation clinic" when it
did not merely issue a PCA, but instead authored an opinion that
acknowledged and responded to the client's position).
57. Wexler, supra note 14, at 769-73.
58. Id. at 772.
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anticipate and acknowledge a certain mind set: it is at this
juncture or even earlier in the article that seasoned lawyers,
especially ones that see themselves more as hired guns, might
balk at the depiction of defense counsel as healer, as a player in a
rehabilitative process.
In fact, those of us claiming to be
proponents of therapeutic jurisprudence are accustomed to
rebutting what constitutes an almost reflex response on the part of
certain members of the traditional bar, which is "I'm a lawyer not a therapist, not a social worker, not a nursemaid." 9 This
unsurprising rejoinder conceivably has its roots in the older law
school curriculum in which "[lawyers trained to be professionals
have not been trained in how to respond to... anxiety, hurt
feelings, and other emotions.' °
Contemporary legal education, however, is evolving. Now law
schools do offer classes in therapeutic jurisprudence and even
incorporate it into other courses, like law school clinics, which are
the places in which students interact with real life clients.
Professor Leslie Larkin Cooney asserts that "the application of
Therapeutic Jurisprudence to clinical teaching can have far
ranging results" and opposes what has been a near banishment of
emotions from training and legal practice:
Emotions do have a powerful impact on the attorney-client
relationship and students need to learn how to identify them and
the role they play in the relationship. Feelings of rejection and
abandonment, a sense of failure, loss of a dream, and helplessness
are all emotions that may keep the client from focusing on the legal
goals. If students fail to address these emotions in a counseling
session, and choose only to focus on reasoning, arguing, or giving
advice, clients feel ignored or minimized and the relationship is
damaged.
Therapeutic Jurisprudence teaches students that
supportive denial is not likely to be helpful, and may make matters
worse. 62
While opponents of therapeutic jurisprudence may still adhere to
the notion that emotions and counseling sessions do not fit the job
description of lawyer, the reality is that a whole new breed of
lawyers are emerging from law schools with an appreciation of
therapeutic jurisprudence or "the use of social science to study the
extent to which a legal rule or practice promotes the psychological

59. Id. at 747 ("A typical initial response to a proposed broadening of the
traditional role of defense counsel is, 'Hey, I'm not a therapist.'").
60. Robert Eli Rosen, And Tell Tchaikovsky The News: The Wedding of
Therapeutic Jurisprudenceand Preventive Lawyering, 5 PSYCHOL. PUB. POLY.
& L. 944, 946 (1999); see also Leslie Larkin Cooney, Heart And Soul: A New
Rhythm For Clinical Externships, 17 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 407 (2005)
(describing the history of therapeutic jurisprudence).
61. Cooney, supra note 60, at 407.
62. Id. at 419-20.
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and physical well-being of the people it affects."6 This does not
just mean that graduates will have more refined listening and
interpersonal skills, but also that some future lawyers will be
more in touch with themselves, more introspective, more
questioning, and more creative. They are also more likely to be
receptive to new ideas or at least open to a healthy re-evaluation of
conventional methods, even ones that have become entrenched in
our legal system.
One thing indelibly ingrained in the minds of some of the
more traditional criminal defense practitioners is that their main
job is about keeping the client out of jail, or at least doing
reasonable damage control by obtaining the best possible sentence.
Of course, others, who define themselves as defense lawyers with a
broader calling, also equate their mission with the protection of
constitutional rights. This author does not intend to demean in
any way such goals, which are, of course, completely valid and
commendable. But the point is that this whole school of thought
can tend to bring with it a certain mindset with respect to client
confessions. Succinctly put, the criminal defense attorney has
been trained to treat client confession as a Pandora's box that
should remain hermetically sealed at all costs. In a provocative
article, Professor Robert F. Cochran explains that "the common
practice of lawyers is to rush to the police station or corporate
office and tell the client not to talk to anyone about the offense,"
and "many lawyers tell their clients that they do not want to know
whether the client committed the crime. '" Stated otherwise, when
63. Id. at 408-409 (quoting Christopher Slobogin, Therapeutic
Jurisprudence:Five Dilemmas to Ponder, 1 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y. & L. 193,
196 (1995)).
64. Cochran, supra note 9, at 331. Cochran explains that since pursuant to
the professional responsibility rules, "a lawyer may not knowingly present a
client's false testimony to the court" and [i]f a client gives perjured testimony,
the lawyer must disclose it[,] ...some lawyers tell their client not to tell them
whether the client has committed the crime." Id. 348-49. According to
Cochran, this is "a highly questionable practice" because it "may enable
lawyers to assist the client in perjury, the very thing that the rules are
designed to prevent," and it may also "place[] the lawyer at risk" because a
"lawyer [that] fails to discover exculpatory evidence.., could be vulnerable to
a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel." Id. at 349. Courts, lawyers, and
scholars have struggled with the ethical dilemmas inherent in prohibition
against knowingly presenting perjury to a court. See Orange County Bar
Association, Formal Op. 2003-1 (Client Perjury and the Criminal Defense
Attorney) (2004) (stating that "[ilf the client refuses to follow the attorney's
advice and insists on providing perjurious testimony, the attorney may seek to
withdraw from representation, but this Opinion recommends that the attorney
instead proceed with a 'narrative' presentation of the testimony after
providing a recommended set of advisements and admonishments to the
client."); see also Monroe H. Freedman, ControversialNo More - The Perjury
Trilemma Revisited, 9 No. 4 PROF LAw. 2, 2 (1998) (describing "the ethical
trilemma - the lawyer is required to know everything, to keep it in

The John MarshallLaw Review

[40:41

it comes to confession, the client is silenced and good defense work
is equated with accomplishing this as swiftly and efficiently as
possible. Although Cochran acknowledges that there are some
sound reasons for this approach, he believes that confession has its
value because it "can bring peace, joy, forgiveness, reconciliation,
and a renewed sense of one's identity. " '
Cochran further points out that the "liberal lawyering model"
in which "the lawyer is neutral, the autonomy of the client is the
highest good, and the state procedure (i.e., the adversary system)
is trusted to yield the good" is actually inimical to the actual
practice of criminal defense attorneys, who take measures to
ensure that the client has no opportunity to confess.' Cochran,
suggesting that "[1]awyers who prohibit client confession" actually
do "make an authoritarian choice" and "limit the client's freedom,"
instead proposes that lawyers engage in moral discourse with a
client."
confidence, and to be candid with the court, specifically with regard to client
perjury" and concluding that "it is impossible for a lawyer to obey all three
rules"); Ward Hennecker, CriminalDefendant Perjury: What Does One Do?, 28
J LEGAL PROF. 165 (2003-2004) (suggesting that the tactic of disclosing
intended perjury and the goal of being a zealous advocate for the client by
protecting confidences are hopelessly at odds and that a lawyer will choose
which of the rules he or she values most); Peter J. Henning, Lawyers, Truth,
and Honesty In Representing Clients, 20 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB.
POL'Y 209, 215 (2006) (proposing that "[tihe principle of honesty, rather than
truth, can provide a further means, in addition to the lawyer's own ethical
judgment, to accommodate the dual roles of the attorney as an advocate for a
client and an officer of the court").
65. Cochran, supra note 9, at 333. Cochran acknowledges that confession
.can also bring damage to reputation, stress, criminal punishment, and
damage to family," id., and that "some lawyers [who] see the defense lawyer's
role as protecting society and clients from the powers of the state" believe that
"almost any impediments to the state are good because they limit the ability of
the state to abuse its prosecutorial power" and that confessions should be
blocked because they "ease[] the burden of the state." Id. at 349-50. He also
points out that others believe that "the injustice of the state's punishment
system justifies a lawyer's strong presumption against confession," which
"may lead to an unjust result because penalties may be excessive, judges have
increasingly limited discretion as to sentencing, conditions in prison are
unreasonably harsh, and some clients are subject to the death penalty." Id. at
350. Cochran, however, takes the position that although the lawyer should
apprise the client of the possible penalties and the reality of prison conditions,
the decision should be made by the client. Id.
66. Id. at 330.
But see PETER BROOKS, TROUBLING CONFESSIONS:
67. Id. at 331.
SPEAKING GUILT IN LAW AND LITERATURE (2000). According to Brooks, "what

we learn about confession from literature, from the religious tradition, and
from the psychotherapeutic culture, suggests that where confession is
concerned, the law needs to recognize that its conceptions of human
motivation and volition are particularly flawed, even perhaps something of a
fiction." Id. at 5. Brooks suggests that the "heavy reliance on confessions in
criminal justice creates a certain unease." Id.
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What Cochran brands as quite commonplace - namely,
defense counsel's silencing of even the mere whisper of a
confession - oppugns some philosophical tenets of therapeutic
lawyering with its emphasis on voice, validation, and voluntary
In essence, what transpires in the world that
participation.'
Cochran debunks is a lawyer despotically imposing choices on
clients and blocking voices and stories. Such an approach can
have the effect of excluding clients from the very decision-making
that will determine their own futures. In short, the traditional
confession taboo can under certain circumstances stifle healing,
It can conflict with the therapeutic
growth, and change.
jurisprudence model in which potential clients are given the choice
of or opportunity to choose the acceptance of responsibility route
by admitting their problem and addressing its underlying causes.69
For some clients (of course, not all), defense counsel's confession
taboo can unwittingly ruin a human life by obstructing a rare and
redemptive option.
III.

THE CONSTITUTION AND CONFESSIONS: VOLUNTARINESS AND
FAIRNESS

Any student of criminal procedure will not fail to notice that
the typical syllabus comprehensively covers the constitutional
standards applied to confessions. Up until the mid-1960s, the Due
Process Clause was the sole basis for deeming incriminating
statements unconstitutional. Later, the United States Supreme
Court found that both the Fifth Amendment Privilege Against
Self-Incrimination and the Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel
also preside over the constitutionality and admissibility of
As in therapeutic jurisprudence, the constituent
confessions.
concerns are with voluntariness and fairness.
A focus in seminal Supreme Court decisions from the early
Due Process Clause era to the present is on the distinction
between a voluntary and a coerced confession. On a more subtle
level, even the Sixth Amendment case law harbors such a concern.
There is, however, another omnipresent thread running through
all the confession cases - namely, the importance of safeguarding
what we, as Americans, perceive as a fair accusatorial procedure.
A. Confessions and Due Process
At common law, courts excluded coerced confessions from
evidence because they believed them to be untrustworthy. In

68. See supra notes 22-35 and accompanying text
philosophy that underlies therapeutic jurisprudence).
69. See supra notes 22-35 (describing the goals
jurisprudence).

(describing
of
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7
" police officers
1936, in a landmark case, Brown v. Mississippi,
to dictated
confessed
until
they
the
defendants
beat
brutally
statements. In overturning the convictions under the Due Process
Clause, the Court opined that confessions extracted that way were
likely to be unreliable. But later cases, examining the dangers of
coerced confessions, suggest that untrustworthiness is not the only
reason to bar such improper confessions.
The basic tension in confessions law is between the interests
in the protection of individual rights and the facilitation of law
enforcement efforts to solve crimes."v Those prone to tip the scale
in law enforcement's favor fear imposing restraints on police that
could impair their ability to effectively interrogate suspects.72 For
them, the reliability of the evidence is and should be the deciding
issue. Professor Fred Inbau is a prime progenitor of the position
that the only types of police interrogation that should be
proscribed are those likely to lead to false or unreliable
confessions. 73 Inbau once suggested that interrogators should ask
the question: "Is what I am about to do, or say, apt to make an
innocent person confess?"74 For Inbau this is "the only test that is
fair both to the public and to the accused or suspected
individual."'5

70. 297 U.S. 278 (1936).
71. See Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 315 (1959) (stating that the Court

is "forced to resolve a conflict between two fundamental interests of society; its
interest in prompt and efficient law enforcement, and its interest in
preventing the rights of its individual members from being abridged by
unconstitutional methods of law enforcement"); Daniel W. Sasaki, Guarding
the Guardians:Police Trickery and Confessions, 40 STAN. L. REV. 1593, 1595
(1988) (discussing the "classic struggle... between the protection of
constitutionally-based individual rights and the facilitation of effective law
enforcement").
72. See Sasaki, supra note 71, at 1595.
73. FRED E. INBAU ET AL., CRIMINAL INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS 217

(3d ed. 1986); see also Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 449 (1966) (discussing
the methods described in the manuals by Inbau, et al. as "reflect[ing] their
experiences and [being] ... the most effective psychological stratagems to
employ during interrogation"); Yale Kamisar, Fred E. Inbau: "The Importance
of Being Guilty", 68 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 182, 183 (1977) ("Inbau taught
criminal procedure and its constitutional dimensions - all the while he
yearned for, and fought for, the day when criminal procedure would have no
(or at least very few) constitutional dimensions."); Sasaki, supra note 71, at
1595 (describing Inbau as "the chief advocate of" the "pro-prosecution
approach").
74. INBAU ET AL., supra note 73. See also Sasaki, supra note 71, at 1595
(quoting Professor Inbau's advice to interrogators about interrogation tactics).
75. Id.; see Sasaki, supra note 71, at 1595 (citing Inbau's contention of the
test's fairness); see also BROOKS, supra note 67, at 13 (discussing the police
interrogation manuals by Fred E. Inbau, John E. Reid, and Charles E. Ohara,
"works which at the time of Miranda had attained a circulation of over fortyfour thousand copies (and in their revised editions continue to he widely used")
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Reliability, however, is not the sole fixation in the landmark
Due Process confession trilogy: Ashcraft v. Tennessee,7 Spano v.
New York," and Colorado v. Connelly."8 Such cases scrutinize the
conduct of the interrogators themselves and stress not just the
unreliability of what is extracted, but also the necessity of
preserving what is sacrosanct - namely, public confidence in this
country's penal system. In these cases, the Court either explicitly
or implicitly inquires as to whether official methods used to obtain
the confession were consistent with our notions of what constitutes
a fair system of criminal justice. The Court has stated that
coercive methods result in an "involuntary" confession and this is
true irrespective of whether they did or could have made an
innocent person falsely confess.
In Ashcraft, 9 Ashcraft, charged with having hired a man to
murder his wife, was convicted as an accessory before the fact.
Ashcraft argued that his alleged confession was "extorted" from
him in violation of due process.' In reversing his conviction, the
Court agreed and based the decision on the totality of the
circumstances, which were indeed quite egregious.
Police officers had placed Ashcraft into custody and held him
there for thirty-six hours.
During that time, he was kept
incommunicado and deprived of sleep or rest. There were relays of
experienced investigators and lawyers, who questioned him
practically without respite from Saturday evening until Monday
morning. The record reflects that the reason the officers worked in
shifts was because they themselves became exhausted and needed
breaks.
In concluding that if Ashcraft confessed, it was not voluntary
but compelled, the Court said that such a situation "is so
inherently coercive that its very existence is irreconcilable with
the possession of mental freedom by a lone suspect against whom
its full coercive force is brought to bear."81 In Justice Black's
decision, it is apparent that what troubled the Court was not just
the potential unreliability of such a compelled confession, but its
contravention of something sacrosanct:
There have been, and are now, certain foreign nations with
governments dedicated to an opposite policy: governments which
convict individuals with testimony obtained by police organizations
possessed of an unrestrained power to seize persons suspected of

and stating that "[t]he tactics preached by these manuals are as chilling as
one might imagine").

76. 322 U.S. 143 (1944).
77. 360 U.S. 315 (1959).
78.
79.
80.
81.

479 U.S. 157 (1986).
322 U.S. 143.
Id. at 145.
Id. at 154.
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crimes against the state, hold them in secret custody, and wring
from them confessions by physical or mental torture. So long as the
Constitution remains the basic8 2law of our Republic, America will not
have that kind of government.
Similar concerns surface in Spano,' which involved a postindictment confession and a first-degree murder conviction of a 25year-old Italian immigrant. In that case, a team of experienced
officers and prosecutors interrogated Spano, who had a limited
education and was "emotionally unstable and maladjusted."'
Questioning did not take place during regular business hours, but
began in early evening and ended about eight hours later.
Further, the interrogators persisted despite Spano's repeated
refusals to answer on the advice of his attorney and despite his
requests to contact his retained counsel.
The coercion in Spano had the added ingredient of deception:
the interrogators instructed Bruno, Spano's buddy, who was a
"fledgling police officer," to falsely inform Spano that his
"telephone call had gotten him into trouble, that his job was in
jeopardy, and that loss of his job would be disastrous to his three
children, his wife and his unborn child."' Spano essentially
buckled under such repeated entreaties and lies.
The Court considered "all the facts in their post-indictment
setting" and found that Spano's "will was overborne by official
While the
pressure, fatigue and sympathy falsely aroused."'
all
of
this
made
Spano
Court did not conceivably believe that
confess to something he did not do, Chief Justice Warren's decision
clarified that "the use of involuntary confessions does not turn
alone on their inherent untrustworthiness."87 Rather, "it also
turns on the deep-rooted feeling that the police must obey the law
while enforcing the law," and "that in the end life and liberty can
be as much endangered from illegal methods used to convict those
thought to be criminals as from the actual criminals themselves."'
As in Ashcraft, the Spano Court did not see reliability as the
lynchpin of the Constitutional question, but rather frowned upon
the coercive techniques themselves because they undermine
fairness and criminal justice.
Connelly,' a post-Miranda decision, further demotes the
reliability factor in determining the admissibility of confessions.
Unlike the situation in Ashcraft and Spano, in Connelly it was the

82. Id. at 155.
83. 360 U.S. 315.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

322 n.3.
317, 319.
323.
320.
320-21.

89. 479 U.S. 157.
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defendant himself, "without any prompting," that initiated police
contact.' Basically, Connelly just walked up to an officer,
announced that he had murdered someone, and said that he
wanted to discuss it. When the officer advised him of his Miranda
rights, Connelly said that he understood, but still wanted to
discuss the murder. After a detective arrived and reiterated his
rights, Connelly told him that he had come all the way from
Boston to confess. While in police headquarters, Connelly detailed
his story to the police and even gave them the precise location of
the murder.
The next day, however, when Connelly became disorientated
during an interview with the public defender's office, they sent
him to a hospital for evaluation.
Connelly revealed to the
psychiatrist that he was listening to the "voice of God" when he
confessed.91 On the basis of the psychiatrist's testimony that
Connelly suffered from a psychosis that impaired his ability to
make free and rational choices, the trial court found that his
initial statements and custodial confession were "involuntary."92
The court suppressed the incriminating statements even though
the police had not done anything improper or coercive. Also, the
court believed that Connelly's mental illness vitiated his putative
waiver of the right to counsel and privilege against selfincrimination. The Colorado Supreme Court affirmed,92 but the
United States Supreme Court reversed and remanded.94
The Supreme Court concluded that there was no due process
violation because there was no coercive police activity, which is "a
necessary predicate
to the finding that a confession is not
'voluntary."'99
Justice Rehnquist, authoring
the opinion,
interpreted "the cases over the 50 years since Brown v. Mississippi
[as focusing] upon the crucial element of police overreaching" and
said that while the defendant's mental condition can be a
"significant factor in the 'voluntariness' calculus," that by itself is
not controlling.'
The Connelly Court found that the Colorado Supreme Court
had also erred with respect to finding an invalid waiver of
Miranda rights. In so doing, the Court faulted the state court for
"importing into this area of constitutional law notions of 'free will'

90. Id. at 160.
91. Id. at 161.
92. Id. at 162. Relying on the decisions in Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293
(1963) and Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568 (1961), the Court held that a
"confession is admissible only if it is a product of the defendant's rational

intellect and 'free will.'" Id.
93. People v. Connelly, 702 P.2d 722 (1985).
94. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157.

95. Id. at 167.
96. Id. at 163-67 (discussing Brown v. Mississippi,297 U.S. 278 (1936)).
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that have no place there" and emphasized that while "Miranda
protects defendants against government coercion leading them to
surrender rights protected by the Fifth Amendment[,] it goes no
further than that.9 7 The Court said that Connelly's "perception of
coercion flowing from the 'voice of God,' however important or
significant such a perception may be in other disciplines, is a
matter to which the United States Constitution does not speak." 98
While the Ashcraft and Spano Courts suggest that
voluntariness does not rest solely on reliability, they do not
altogether dispense with that factor. What they do is simply add
on another layer of reliability by demanding that the methods
used to extract a confession comport with our "deep-rooted feeling
that the police must obey the law while enforcing the law.",9 The
Connelly decision, however, appears to demote reliability by
suggesting that the Constitution might tolerate an untrustworthy
confession as long as it was not obtained through police
overreaching.
After Connelly, there are two species of involuntary
confessions: the first is constitutionally infirm because it is
rendered involuntary by outside forces - namely, coercive law
enforcement tactics. The second is internally involuntary and
thus, has no constitutional import because mental illness is what
has derailed the individual's ability to make a free and rational
choice and is what prompted the self-incrimination. As discussed
below, in Crime and Punishment, Dostoyevsky eradicates that
demarcation between the two types of involuntary confessions."
For Dostoyevsky, coercion from the outside, like police pressure,
and internal compulsion, like a mental illness that obliterates free
will, can both equally produce confessions that do and should
amount to nullities. 01

97. Id. at 169-70.
98. Id. at 170-71.
99. Spano, 360 U.S. at 320.
100. See infra note 283 and accompanying text (explaining that Porfiry
believes voluntary confessions are of utmost importance and that confessions
resulting from coercion or psychosis are involuntary); see also infra Part V.A
(describing Porfiry's therapeutic jurisprudence and his understanding that a
confession has to really be an act of free will and thus not coerced by outside
forces or delusional inner voices).
101. See infra Part V.A; see also BROOKS, supra note 67, at 170 (suggesting
that Connelly may, because of its special facts, be something of an aberration

in Supreme Court rulings on confessions, '[blut it once again points to, and
creates, an unease about confessional speech and the wisdom of holding it to a
standard of 'voluntariness' that seems better designed for almost any kind of
speech"). Brooks asks: "Is the psychotic's discourse voluntary? Is that of any

criminal suspect? Do we care?" Id.
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B. Confessions and The Fifth Amendment
The totality-of-the-circumstances approach to the due process
inquiry, however, proved to be somewhat unwieldy: courts found it
difficult to consistently apply and law enforcement officers had
trouble conforming their conduct to its unpredictable dictates.
Consequently, in the mid-1960s, the United States Supreme Court
turned to the Fifth Amendment privilege against self
incrimination as a basis for regulating police012 practices used to
obtain incriminating statements from suspects.
In the famous case of Miranda v. Arizona," the Court set

forth required procedures for police to follow to assure that
individuals are not being compelled to incriminate themselves in
violation of the Fifth Amendment. In so doing, Chief Justice
Warren's opinion emphasized the coerciveness inherent in police
custody, stressing that the pressure can be mental as well as
physical. The Court was especially concerned with the fact that
interrogation takes place in privacy, which means that there is a
"gap" in our awareness of what transpires in the interrogation
chamber.'"
The Court, turning to various police manuals and texts
documenting successful techniques, summarized the tactics that
effectively extract incriminating statements from suspects. While
abandoning the totality-of-the-circumstances
approach, the
Miranda Court nevertheless echoed the old due process concerns
with securing trustworthy evidence and with safeguarding the
unfettered exercise of free will. The Court made it clear, however,
that of integral and paramount value is the preservation of public
faith in the fairness of our accusatory system of justice:
It is obvious that such an interrogation environment is created for
no purpose other than to subjugate the individual to the will of his
examiner. This atmosphere carries its own badge of intimidation.
To be sure, this is not physical intimidation, but it is equally
destructive of human dignity.
The current practice of
incommunicado interrogation is at odds with one of our Nation's
most cherished principles - that the individual may not be
compelled to incriminate himself. Unless adequate protective
devices are employed to dispel the compulsion inherent in custodial
surroundings, no statement obtained from the defendant can truly
be the product of his free choice.'°
The Miranda Court called the Fifth Amendment privilege "the
essential mainstay of our adversary system" with its underlying
102. See generally Sasaki, supra note 71, at 1604 (discussing how "in
Miranda,the Court sought to obviate the necessity for making a voluntariness
determination").
103. Miranda,384 U.S. 436.
104. Id. at 448.
105. Id. at 457-58.
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foundation being governmental respect for the "dignity and
integrity of its citizens.""° This privilege, which protects "the
inviolability of the human personality" and "our accusatory system
of criminal justice," means that the "government seeking to
punish... individual[s] [must] produce the evidence against
[them] by its own independent labors, rather than by the cruel,

simple expedient of compelling it from [their] own mouth[s] ."107 As
such, the Court set forth the requisites for effectively apprising the
accused of his or her rights and for honoring an accused's exercise
of such rights.
More recently, in Dickerson v. United States,1n° the Supreme
Court deemed Miranda a constitutional decision, declined to
overrule it, and rejected Congress' attempt to essentially revive
the totality of circumstances test. But after Miranda and even
after its putative apotheosis in Dickerson, Supreme Court
decisions have diluted the rule of and principles behind Miranda,
have demoted the decision to a mere prophylaxis,O" and have even
given police leeway to circumvent a suspect's invocation of the
By way of example, there exists an impeachment
privilege."'

106. Id. at 460.
107. Id.
108. 530 U.S. 428.
109. See, e.g., Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 437 (2000)
(admitting that the Court has "created several exceptions to Miranda's
warnings requirement and [has] repeatedly referred to the Miranda warnings
as 'prophylactic'. . . and 'not themselves rights protected by the Constitution'"
(citing New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 653 (1984) and Michigan v. Tucker,
417 U.S. 433, 444 (1974))); see also Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 438 n.2 (listing
other cases in which the Court had undermined Miranda's Constitutional
status). Responding to Dickerson, Kamisar comments:
Civil libertarians had hoped all the exceptions to Miranda based on the
assumption it was not really a constitutional decision would no longer be
good law after Dickerson was decided. But the Supreme Court has now
made it clear that what it reaffirmed in Dickerson was not the Miranda
doctrine as it burst onto the scene in 1966, but rather Miranda with all
its post-Warren court exceptions frozen in time.
Yale Kamisar, Miranda'sReprieve, 92 A.B.A. J. 48, 51 (2006).
110. Some commentators, like Professor Cassel, have also assailed Miranda.
See generally Paul G. Cassell, Miranda's "Negligible" Effect on Law
Enforcement: Some Skeptical Observations, 20 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 327
(1997) (blaming Miranda for decreasing the amount of successful
interrogations, lowering police clearance rate for violent offenses, and
increasing the crime rate itself); Paul G. Cassell & Brett S. Hayman, Police
Interrogationin the 1990s: An Empirical Study of Miranda, 43 UCLA L. REV.
839, 843 (1996) (reporting a study's conlusion that "the Miranda decision,
despite the promises of the Court and its defenders, has yet to be empirically
justified as the proper balance between the competing interests of criminal
suspects and society at large"). But see Stephen J. Schulhofer, Bashing
Miranda is Unjustified - and Harmful, 20 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 347
(1997) (praising Miranda as the benefactor of all of the legal actors in the
criminal justice system); Stephen J. Schulhofer, Miranda's PracticalEffect:

20061

The Therapeutic JurisprudenceConfession

exception. In Harrisv. New York.. and United States v. Havens, 2
the Court held that the state can use suspects' statements taken in
violation of Miranda to impeach their credibility if they choose to
testify at trial on their own behalf.
In other cases, the Court has deemed admissible certain
evidentiary fruit of a Miranda violation as long as it is not the
confession itself. As such, in Michigan v. Tucker,"' the police
discovered the identity of a prosecution witness when they
obtained the accused's statement without full compliance with
Miranda. In finding that the introduction of the third-party
witness testimony did not violate the Fifth Amendment, the Court
enervated Miranda's exclusionary rule.
In United States v.
4
Patane,"
the Court found that the failure to give Miranda
warnings did not require suppression of physical evidence, like a
gun, which was the fruit of the suspect's statements. Both cases
give police license to fish around without Miranda safeguards so
that they can secure admissible third-party witnesses or physical
evidence.
Other cases, like Oregon v. Elstad,"5 go further by condoning
actual police tricks to evade Miranda rules. Elstad allows the
police to first question suspects without administering Miranda
warnings and then deliver the warnings later after suspects
incriminate themselves.
Under Elstad, while the unwarned
statements themselves are to be excluded, if the suspect later
waives his or her rights and repeats the same statements after
proper warnings, they are admissible. For police, this creates a
viable way of circumventing Miranda because suspects that have

Substantial Benefits and Vanishingly Small Costs, 90 NW. U.L. REV. 500, 563
(1996) (rebutting Cassell and concluding that "Mirandais - and deserves to
be - here to stay"); see also Peter Arenella, Miranda Stories, 20 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POLY 375 (1996-1997) (analyzing the Cassell-Schulhofer debate and

concluding that Schulhofer is correct).
111. 401 U.S. 222 (1971).
112. 446 U.S. 620 (1980).
113. 417 U.S. 433 (1974); see also Kamisar, supra note 109, at 50 ("Another
Rehnquist opinion that built on Tucker was New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649
(1984)... [which] recognized a public safety exception to the need for Miranda
warnings in a prosecution of a defendant who answered a question by police
officers who had chased him into a supermarket.").
114. 542 U.S. 630 (2004); see also Kamisar, supra note 109, at 51 ("A
majority of the [Patane] Court (including Rehnquist) seemed to attach no
significance whatever to the fact that only a few years earlier, Rehnquist,
speaking for the Court, had told us that Miranda had 'announced a
constitutional rule.').

115. 470 U.S. 298 (1985); see also id. at 321 (Brennan, J., dissenting)
("Today's decision, in short, threatens disastrous consequences far beyond the
outcome in this case.").
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already confessed are likely to feel that there is nothing to be
gained if they later heed the warnings and remain silent.'
While it is this author's opinion that such cases whittling
away at the Constitutional Miranda rules are poorly reasoned and
disingenuous, such an argument is bromidic and also not really
germane to this article's thesis. What is significant here, however,
is the fact that most of the cases arguably annihilating or at least
debilitating Miranda harbor reminders that the due process
voluntariness inquiry is still (at least, theoretically) intact. In this
respect, the Elstad Court stressed that the unwarned questioning
was not coercive and said that it did not "condone inherently
coercive police tactics or methods offensive to due process that
render the initial admission involuntary and undermine the
suspect's will to invoke his rights once they are read to him.""7
Voluntariness is also alive and well in Missouri v. Seibert,"' a
more recent case in which the Court, although declining to
overrule Elstad, found that the particular question-first tactic
employed was impermissible for the very reason that it "effectively
threaten[ed] to thwart Miranda'spurpose of reducing the risk that
a coerced confession would be admitted."" 9 Here the Seibert facts
are worth visiting because, as discussed below, they bear some
resemblance to the plot in Crime and Punishment.
As in Crime and Punishment, the Seibert case involved a
tragedy that spawned more tragedy. It began when Seibert's
child, Jonathan, who had cerebral palsy, died in his sleep. Fearing
that she would be charged with neglect because of Jonathan's
bedsores, Seibert, along with her teenage sons and their friends,
concocted a scheme to incinerate the body by torching the mobile
home. Donald, a mentally ill teenager, was also living with
Siebert, and the team planned to leave him in the burning house
so that it would not appear that Jonathan had been left
unattended. Here, as in Crime and Punishment, the project
claimed an extra victim when Donald perished in the fire.'
116. See id. at 325 (Brennan, J. dissenting) ("One of the factors that can

vitiate the voluntariness of a subsequent confession is the hopeless feeling of
an accused that he has nothing to lose by repeating his confession, even where
the circumstances that rendered his first confession illegal have been
removed."); see also id. at 365 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (accusing the Court of
"denigrat[ing] the importance of one of the core constitutional rights that
protects every American citizen from the kind of tyranny that has flourished
in other societies"). See generally Kamisar, supra note 109, at 51 ("The Elstad
case seemed to say - as had Rehnquist's earlier opinions - that a violation of
Miranda is not a violation of a constitutional right, but only of a procedural
safeguard designed to implement a constitutional right.").
117. Elstad, 470 U.S. at 317.
118. 542 U.S. 600 (2004).

119. Id. at 617.
120. In CRIME AND PuNIsHMENT, Raskolnikov refers to his plan to murder
the old

money-lender

as

a "project," and

his premeditated

murder
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Five days later, the police entered the picture. They
awakened Seibert at about three in the morning and arrested her.
The officer, who was instructed to refrain from giving Seibert
Miranda warnings, left her alone in an interview room for a while.
An officer then questioned Siebert without Miranda warnings for
about thirty to forty minutes while continually squeezing her arm
and reiterating "Donald was also to die in his sleep."' 1 Once
Seibert gave incriminating admissions, the officer rewarded her
with coffee and a cigarette. After that, the officer turned on a tape
recorder, gave Seibert the Miranda warnings, and obtained her
signed waiver. When he resumed questioning and confronted her
with her prewarned answers, Seibert incriminated herself again.
The state charged Seibert with first-degree murder for her
role in Donald's death and Seibert, like Elstad, sought to exclude
both her pre- and post-warning statements. At the suppression
hearing, the officer testified that he consciously withheld the
Miranda warnings to do what he had been trained to do - to
question first and warn later. Following Elstad, the trial court
suppressed only the prewarning statements and a jury convicted
Seibert of second-degree murder. The Missouri appellate court
affirmed, but the state supreme court reversed,'22 finding that the
second statements should also have been suppressed.
The Supreme Court, agreeing with the Supreme Court of
Missouri, noted that the purpose of the question-first technique,
which was already gaining popularity, was to render Miranda
warnings ineffective and to essentially divest suspects of a
meaningful choice between speech and silence. It enabled law
enforcement to secure a confession that suspects would not
ordinarily make had they understood their rights, and then with
that confession already in hand, the interrogator could basically
count on getting a duplicate confession after simply reciting the
warnings. As the Court explained, "a suspect would hardly think
he had a genuine right to remain silent, let alone persist in so
believing
once the police began to lead him over the same ground
"3
again. 1
The Seibert Court construed Elstad as involving an officer's
good faith failure to warn and said that in that context the delayed
warnings did not necessarily obliterate the choice between
following up or staying silent. The Court contrasted the facts in
Elstad with the police strategy aimed at Seibert that was
specifically designed to nullify Miranda and exploit the impression
inadvertently claims an extra victim, his intended target's step-sister, who
happened to walk in at the wrong time. See infra Part IV.B (discussing
Raskolnikov during the commission of the crime).
121. Seibert, 542 U.S. at 605.
122. State v. Seibert, 93 S.W. 3d 700 (2002).
123. Seibert, 542 U.S. at 613.
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that further questioning was a continuation of the earlier ordeal.
According to the Court, it would have been "reasonable to regard
the two sessions as parts of a continuum, in which it would have
been unnatural to refuse to repeat at the second stage what had
been said before." 24 What Seibert confirmed was that at least
theoretically what is at the very heart of Miranda and confession
law is meaningful choice and the goal of reducing the risk that
choiceless confessions are admitted as evidence.'
C. Confessions And the Sixth Amendment
The Sixth Amendment Right to the Assistance of Counsel is
another restraint on governmental attempts to admit defendants'
incriminating statements. This emerged even before Miranda,
when in Massiah v.United States, 2 6 the Court held that the Sixth
Amendment mandated the exclusion from admission into evidence
of statements that an already indicted defendant made to a
government agent. What underlies Massiah and its progeny is
once again the potent policy of protecting the integrity of our
adversarial system of justice. While they may not always be quite
so perspicuous in the Sixth Amendment context, voluntariness and
choice are likewise prevalent concerns.
In Massiah, the Court, relying on the concurrence in Spano v.
New York, 27 stressed the impropriety of police eliciting a
confession after a defendant had been indicted and said that a
"Constitution which guarantees a defendant the aid of counsel
at... a trial could surely vouchsafe no less to an indicted
defendant under interrogation by the police in a completely
extrajudicial proceeding."" The Court approved the approach that
New York courts had followed after the Spano decision, which
proscribed the interrogation of indicted defendants without the
presence of counsel, and agreed that the "basic dictates of fairness
in the conduct of criminal causes and the fundamental rights of

124. Id. at 616-617.

125. Id. at 617 ("These circumstances must be seen as challenging the
comprehensibility and efficacy of the Miranda warnings to the point that a
reasonable person in the suspect's shoes would not have understood them to
convey a message that she retained a choice about continuing to talk."); see
also Kamisar, supra note 109, at 51 (Stating that "Pataneis the general rule;

Seibert is the striking exception," and that while "Dickerson spared Miranda
the death penalty [,] ...four years later when Patane was decided, Miranda
took a bullet to the body.").
126. 377 U.S. 201 (1964); see also Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964)

(excluding defendant's confession after repeated requests by the defendant to
consult with retained counsel were refused and after his attorney had actually
been turned away at the police station).
127. 360 U.S. at 327 (Stewart, J., concurring); see also supra notes 84-88 and
accompanying text.
128. Massiah, 377 U.S. at 204.
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persons charged with crime[s]" required such a constitutional
rule. 2 '
Eleven years later, in Brewer v. Williams,3 ' a criminal
procedure classic, the Court clarified that the Sixth Amendment
right to counsel had survived Mirandaand was alive and well as a
separate restraint on police questioning. Brewer involved the
brutal murder of a little girl, Pamela Powers, who vanished while
attending an event with her family at the YMCA in Des Moines,
Iowa. Williams, who had escaped from a mental hospital and was
living at the YMCA, was seen leaving the lobby with a large
bundle wrapped in a blanket.
After a warrant issued for William's arrest, Williams placed a
long-distance call to a Des Moines attorney, Henry McKnight, who
advised Williams to turn himself in to the Davenport police. When
Williams surrendered, he was booked and given Miranda
warnings. McKnight again conferred with his client, informing
him that Des Moines officers would pick him up and told him not
to talk to them about Pamela Powers. The Des Moines police also
promised that the officers would not question Williams on the
drive back.
After arraignment, the judge again advised Williams of his
Miranda rights and another lawyer, Kelly, told him not say
anything until he could consult with his lawyer back in Des
Moines. When the detective and his colleague arrived to get
Williams, they met with Kelly and repeated the Miranda
warnings. Kelly also reiterated to the detective that Williams was
not to be questioned about Pamela Powers until he had consulted
with McKnight in Des Moines.
When Kelly sensed "some
reservations" on the part of the detective, he "firmly stated that
the agreement with McKnight was to be carried out" and that
there was to be no questioning."3 '
In fact, Kelly even
unsuccessfully tried to accompany Williams in the police car.
En route to Des Moines, the detective, who knew that
Williams was deeply religious and had mental problems, delivered
what has been denominated the "Christian burial speech" in which
he commented on the bad weather, referred to the imperiled task
of finding the child's body, and pressed that the child's parents
deserved a proper "Christian burial" for their little girl. 3 ' In
129. Id. at 205 (quoting People v. Waterman, 175 N.E. 2d 445, 448 (N. Y. Ct.
App. 1961)).
130. 430 U.S. 387 (1977).

131. Id. at 392.
132. Id. at 392-93. The Court stated:
And since we will be going right past the area on the way into Des
Moines, I feel that we could stop and locate the body, that the parents of
this little girl should be entitled to a Christian burial for the little girl
who was snatched away from them on Christmas [Elve and murdered.
And I feel we should stop and locate it on the way in rather than waiting
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response, Williams made incriminating statements and described
the body's location. The Supreme Court held that the admission of
William's statements at his trial violated his right to the
assistance of counsel.
Massiah and Brewer ostensibly eliminate voluntariness and
coercion from the Sixth Amendment analysis. In Massiah, the
Court rejected the government's argument that Massiah, unlike
Spano, was not in custody or subjected to "official pressure" and
instead based the decision on notions of fair play. 3' That is, while
the government could indeed pursue an investigation of the
suspect's criminal activities even after the indictment, it could not
fairly and constitutionally use his own incriminating statements
as evidence against him at his trial."M This was the rule - with or
without coercion.
Similarly, in Brewer, the Court deemed it "unnecessary to
evaluate" whether Williams' self-incriminating statements were
involuntary or to pursue a due process or Miranda-type inquiry
because Williams was "deprived of a different constitutional
right." 3' The Brewer Court echoed Justice Sutherland's
"memorable words" in Powell v. Alabama, that the right,
"guaranteed by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments, is
system of
indispensable to the fair administration of our adversary
136
criminal justice" and "vital" at the pretrial stage.
Despite the fact that early on actual coercion is somewhat
estranged from the Sixth Amendment inquiry, the Supreme Court
at least implicitly later reintroduces it. The Court later construed
Massiah as standing for the proposition that there must an
investigative technique that constitutes "deliberate" elicitation of
incriminating statements, which is the equivalent to coercive
interrogation. 137 This is borne out in two companion cases, United
until morning and trying to come back out after a snow storm and

possibly not being able to find it at all.
Id.
133. Massiah, 377 U.S. at 206.
134. Id. at 207.
135. Brewer, 430 U.S. at 397-398.
136. Id. at 398 (citing Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 57 (1932)).
137. See, e.g., United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264, 270 (1980) ("The
question here is whether under the facts of this case a Government agent

'deliberately elicited' incriminating statements from Henry within the
meaning of Massiah."); Kuhlman v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 457 (1986) ("The
Court in Massiah adopted the reasoning of the concurring opinions in Spano
and held that, once a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel has
attached, he is denied that right when federal agents 'deliberately elicit'
incriminating statements from him in the absence of his lawyer."). But see
Maine v. Molton, 474 U.S. 159 (1985) (rejecting the government's contention
that Moulton was distinguishable from Massiah because inter alia the
defendant himself initiated the meeting with his co-defendant, who was
cooperating with the police).
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States v. Henry"' and Kuhlman v. Wilson,139 and in the Court's
strained attempt to justify opposite results based on essentially
the same set of facts.
In Henry, the Court applied Massiah to incriminating
statements made to a jailhouse informant. The Court agreed with
the court below that there was a Massiah violation because the
informant had engaged the defendant in dialogue and "had
developed a relationship of trust and confidence with [the
defendant] such that [the defendant] revealed incriminating
information."'4 0 The Court thus found reasonable the conclusions
below that the informant "deliberately used his position to secure
incriminating information" at a time when defendant's counsel
was not present."" In Henry, the informant had apparently not
142
questioned the defendant, but rather "stimulated" conversations.
The Court thus aligned this with Massiah because it was
tantamount to "indirect and surreptitious interrogation.""
In
essence, the Henry informant was putatively active and coercive.
Kuhlmann, on nearly identical facts, also involving
incriminating statements made to a jailhouse informant, comes
out the other way no Sixth Amendment violation.
In
Kuhlmann, the defendant was arraigned and incarcerated with
another prisoner, Lee, who agreed to act as a police informant. At
the suppression hearing, it was revealed that Lee had agreed to
listen to defendant's conversations and report his remarks to the
police. When the defendant began talking to Lee about the
robbery, reciting the same story that he had given the police, Lee
responded that it "didn't sound too good.' 44 Over the next few
days, the defendant revised his story. Then, after a visit from his
brother, who told him that family members were upset because
the defendant had committed murder, the defendant described the
crime to Lee and gave incriminating details.
This time the Court, disagreeing with the conclusion below
that the right to counsel was violated, faulted the federal appellate
court for failing to give the state court's findings the requisite
presumption of correctness. In the Court's view, the federal
appellate court should have abided by the state court facts that
purportedly distinguish the circumstances from those in Henry:
namely, that the police in Kuhlmann already possessed "solid
evidence" of defendant's complicity in the crime and that Lee
followed the instructions to just listen to defendant's
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.

447 U.S. 264 (1980).
477 U.S. 436 (1986).
Henry, 447 U.S. at 269.
Id. at 270.
Id. at 273.
Id.
Kuhlmann, 477 U.S. at 439-40.
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"spontaneous" and "unsolicited" statements without asking
questions. 4 ' Chief Justice Burger said in his concurrence, the case
is "clearly distinguishable" from Henry in that there is "a vast
difference between placing an 'ear' in the suspect's cell and placing
a voice in the cell to encourage conversation for the 'ear' to
record.""
According to the Court, the state court correctly
determined that the informant was passive and innocuously noncoercive.
Although possibly untenable in an incarceration context, the
Court in Henry and Kuhlmann draws a line between active and
Essentially, if snitches assert
passive jailhouse informants.
themselves, become a "voice" to oust disclosures, there is
"deliberate elicitation."' 7 If, however, the defendant divulges
information to a mere passive "ear," there is theoretically no
coercion and what occurs is simply relegated to the category of a
rather unremarkable voluntary statement.l4
In short, while the Due Process Clause and the Fifth and
Sixth Amendments are distinct bases for regulating police
extraction of incriminating statements, in all three contexts it
matters (albeit in varying degrees) that the confession is not
coerced and that the methods used to obtain it do not offend our
notion of a fair accusatorial system of criminal justice. Distilled
down, for both our Constitution and therapeutic jurisprudence,
voluntariness and fairness are right at the core.
IV.

RASKOLNIKOV'S COMPULSION TO CONFESS

For Dostoyevsky, voluntariness and fairness comprise the
core of a good criminal justice system. According to him, a
voluntary confession plus a fair legal process can engender
healing, entirely transform a human being, inspire spiritual
regeneration, and elevate society. This is, however, only part of
Dostoyevsky's thesis in Crime and Punishment, which he
transmits through Rodion Raskolnikov, who is possibly the most
complex, enigmatic, and haunting characters in all of world
literature.
Historians, literary scholars, philosophers, psychiatrists and
psychologists have exhaustively feasted on Raskolnikov, trying to
decipher him and his motives for violently murdering the old
moneylender, Alyona Ivanovna, and her step-sister, Lizaveta."9 In
fact, the psychologists and psychiatrists comprise a class all their
own and tend to ascribe blame to Raskolnikov's mother: for

145.
146.
147.
148.
149.

Id. at 460.
Id. at 461 (Burger, J., concurring).
Id.
Id.
See supra note 8.
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example, Louis Breger, relying extensively on Freudian
psychoanalysis, points to Raskolnikov's "overwhelming ambivalence" to his mother, which has both "sadistic and masochistic
components" and creates a dilemma whereby "[hie can attack the
maternal figure or submit to her."'50 In a somewhat similar vein,
Kathleen Donnellan Garber "surmise[s] that Raskolnikov's oral
needs as an infant were not satisfied," that he is "unable to
distinguish himself as separate from his mother" and exhibits
"behavior replete with manifestations of infantile dependence."' 5'
Others add Raskolnikov's entire family to the indictment, or, as
Psychiatry Professor Jeffery C. Hutzler puts it, "the inevitable
march of powerful family influences force[ed] Raskolnikov into
survival tactics which result in his crime, punishment, and the
resolution of his fearfully pathologic family conflict." '
Another approach, one more sociological, is to downplay the
inner landscape and focus instead on Raskolnikov's bleak
periphery: for example, Dr. Atkin sees Raskolnikov as "a living
being.., at odds with his environment" and suggests that "Ulust
as the causation of criminal behaviour rests both in society and in
the individual, so must responsibility be shared by the two.' 53
Atkin, refuting more prevalent theories that Raskolnikov is
insane, a "distinctly psychopathic personality" or a "manicdepressive" with "systemized delusions of persecution and
grandeur of a paranoiac or the dereism and hallucinations of a
schizophrenic," focuses on his wretched, poverty-stricken context
and the "atmosphere of pessimism [which] could not but have its
effect on ... a type of Russian intellectual who was able to observe
the superficial social contradictions, but saw no way out in the fog
of Westernism, Slavophilism, Nihilism, Liberalism and other
"isms" of the disrupted intelligentsia."" According to Professor
Gary Saul Morson, however, exterior and interior are fused such
that Raskolnikov's "awful room" in St. Petersburg is the objective
correlative of a "sordid state of mind."55 He elaborates:
The ceiling is so low a man can hardly stand up, so Raskolnikov
spends all his time lying on a bedraggled yellow couch. In
Dostoyevsky, dirty yellow is the color of mental illness, and lying on
the couch feeds Raskolnikov's nervous, irritable condition and his
mad dreams of murder for the sake of murder, just to156show he can
do it. He would have done better to put up wall paper.

150. BREGER, supra note 8, at 24-25.
151. Garber, supra note 8, at 16-17.

152. Hutzler, supra note 8, at 335.
153. Atkin, supra note 8, at 255-56, 279.
154. Id. at 262, 278.
155. Gary Saul Morson, A Russian Literature Scholar Reflects On the
Interiorsof Crime and Punishment, INTERIORS, May 1999, at 142.
156. Id.
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Legal scholars have also explored Crime and Punishment and
Raskolnikov from diverse perspectives. By way of example, law
professor William Burnham, relying on Russian legal history,
looks back at the evidentiary rules in place at the time of Crime
and Punishment and attributes the strategy of Porfiry Petrovich,
the examining magistrate, to Russia's stringent requirements for
On the other hand, attorney Vera
admissible confessions.'57
Bergelson tries to contemporize the novel by conducting a
"hypothetical 'retrial'" of Rodion Raskolnikov under the legal and
moral principles reflected in the Model Penal Code."' Also, law
and literature guru, Professor Weisberg, has dealt with
Dostoyevsky quite extensively, but with respect to Crime and
Punishment, dwells primarily on what he sees as the manipulative
maneuvers of "inquisitor" Petrovich, a perspective that has
sparked an intellectual quarrel."'
Cochran's article is really one of the more insightful." He
employs several of Dostoyevsky's stories to reconsider defense
counsel's approach to client confession along with the inherent
conflict between a client's interest in freedom and a client's
interest in "forgiveness, reconciliation, and a clear conscience.""'
While Cochran accurately feels that most of Crime and
Punishment is about "Raskolnikov's punishment at the hands of
his own conscience," Dostoyevsky does more than just teach us
Rather,
about "the consequences of unconfessed guilt." 62
Dostoyevsky shares his invaluable psychological insight into the
evolution of an individual, who personifies the human need to
therapeutically regenerate through confession. Dostoyevsky puts
Raskolnikov's obsession with his crime and his drive to confess
under a microscope, revealing how they dominate his very

157. Burnham, supra note 3.
158. Bergelson, supra note 8, at 921.
159. WEISBERG, supra note 8, at 54; see also Richard Weisberg, Comparative
Literature: The Figure of the 'Examining Magistrate' in Dostoyevsky and
Camus, 29 RUTGERS L. REV. 237, 241-49 (1975-76) (examining Porfiry's role as
an effective inquisitor). But see John D. Ayer, The Very Idea of 'Law And
Literature',85 MICH. L. REV. 895, 901 (1987) ("Weisberg tries to show that all
of his 'protagonists' share the same ressentiment affliction. And he tries to
show, or at least he asserts, that this ressentiment is a peculiarly lawyerly

vice. But for all its asserted coherence, the book has the distinct appearance of
being cobbled together."); Robert Batey, In Defense of Porfiry Petrovich, 26
CARDOzo L. REV. 2283, 2284 (2005) ("Weisberg does not fairly depict Porfiry
Petrovich."); Richard A. Posner, From Billy Budd To Buchenwald, 96 YALE
L.J. 1173, 1176 (1987) (book review) ("The insinuating style of the European
examining magistrate similarly illustrates not the operation of legal
technicalities but the power of informal procedures."); see infra Part V.A

(discussing Porfiry Petrovich).
160. Cochran, supra note 9.

161. Id. at 332.
162. Id. at 360.
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existence before, during, and after the gruesome bludgeoning.
Through our relationship with Raskolnikov, we, as lawyers, can
better understand how to interact with and treat the whole client,
especially one charged with crime.
A. Before the Crime
Before the crime, Raskolnikov's life is a miserable sinkhole.
He is a threadbare, starving, ex-law student, whose saintly sister,
Dunya, is on the brink of prostituting herself for his benefit by
marrying an evil man with a modicum of wealth and social
standing. Raskolnikov's deplorable living quarters consist of a
"room... situated right under the roof of a tall, five-storey
tenement" and "sooner resemble[s] a closet than a place of
habitation."" Dostoyevsky elaborates:
It was a tiny little cell, about six paces long, and it presented a most
pitiful aspect with its grimy, yellow wallpaper that was everywhere
coming off the walls; it was so low-ceilinged that to a person of even
one
slightly above-average height it felt claustrophobic, as though
1
might bang one's head against the plaster at any moment.6
This hovel, in fact, takes on a life (or rather death) of its own:
Dostoyevsky reminds us repeatedly of the tomb's stifling
wretchedness and we see that it is something that Raskolnikov
detests and yet clings to as a refuge. Although Raskolnikov has
"inno uncertain terms, withdrawn from everyone, like a tortoise
into its shell," all of the players in his world at one point or
another meander into and squeeze into his suffocating box.165
Because Raskolnikov is unemployed, in debt, and in arrears on his
rent, his daily life consists of efforts to dodge his landlady and the
maid who live on the floor below in a separate apartment. They in
turn have stopped providing the meals that come with the room,
which not only "irritate[s] him to bile and convulsions," but also
"gratiflies]" him because he is determined to "sink to a lower level
of personal neglect."'66 Although in resolute hiding, Raskolnikov
periodically foists himself in plain view of his creditors. On top of
this, he appears to suffer from seizures that either make him faint
or disoriented.
We also learn that Raskolnikov has "been in a tense, irritable
In fact,
state of mind that verged upon hypochondria."'67
Raskolnikov's name says it all because in Russian raskol means
split or schism." The problem with Raskolnikov and the reason
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165.
166.
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168.
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he is so difficult to pin down is that he is indeed split, at war with
himself at all times and in all things. Whatever you can say about
him, you can easily say the opposite. Whatever Raskolnikov does,
he seeks to retract.
He is, in truth, a caricature of selfcontradiction.
Raskolnikov is "[slo absorbed in himself' and "isolated from
everyone else" and yet, at the same time "[hlis vital interests no
longer concern[] him."'69 In an infantile way, he is a parcel of self
indulgence and also the epitome of self-deprivation. Despite his
campaign to eschew contact and interaction with others, he
searches out conversation and once that is accomplished, tends to
recoil into a reclusive rage.
Early in the novel, this self-professed hermit ventures into a
tavern, meets Marmeladov, and finds himself both irritated with
and desirous of his society. Marmeladov is a middle-aged clerk in
the advanced stages of alcoholism, who sees Raskolnikov as an
affiliate to whom he wants to tell his sob story. 7 ' Marmeladov, a
widower with a fourteen-year old daughter, Sonya, had married
Katerina Ivanovna, a widow with three young children of her own.
For a while, he supported the family, but eventually drank himself
to destitution. After Sonya is pushed into prostitution to save the
impoverished family, Marmeladov worsens: he sells his wife's
clothes, steals money from his family, and takes Sonya's earnings
so that he can buy drinks.
Raskolnikov both rebuffs and befriends Marmeladov. On the
one hand, Raskolnikov has nothing but revulsion for this
drunkard, who has ruined the lives of a consumptive wife and two
starving children, and has let his own daughter, Sonya, become a
prostitute to "treat [his] hangover." 7' On the other hand,
Raskolnikov is sucked into the whole dysfunctional drama when
he escorts wobbly Marmeladov home to a squalid tenement, meets
the dying wife and trembling children, and ends up placing his
DOSTOYEVSKY, supra note 1, at xxviii (noting that Raskol means schism,
which indicates "[olne aspect of Raskolnikov's revolt against God... [because

it] is the term used to describe the split that took place in the Russian
Orthodox Church in the mid seventeenth century..."); see also Burnham,
supra note 3, at 1231 ("Raskolnikov gets his name from the Russian word
raskol, which means a split or schism, and represents the conflict between his
intellectual justifications for the crime and the moral revulsion he feels.").
169. DOSTOYEVSKY, supra note 1, at 5.

170. See BREGER, supra note 8, at 25. As Breger comments:
On [Marmeladov's] ... first encounter with Raskolnikov, he calls
attention to the connection between them: they are both educated men,

men of talent and abilities despite their poor and disheveled
appearance. And, as the story unfolds, it is revealed that the destitution

they suffer is not due to external misfortune in any simple way; each
had a hand in creating his own plight.

Id.
171. DOSTOYEVSKY, supra note 1, at 28.
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only coins "unobtrusively on the[ir] windowsill."172 Immediately
after his impulsive act of compassion and charity toward the
Marmeladov family, Raskolnikov is consumed with regret, pauses
on the staircase, almost changes his mind, and nearly takes back
the gift. But then in a nanosecond, Raskolnikov retracts his near
retraction, "reasoning that he could not possibly take it back now,
and that he would not take it back even if such a thing were
possible." 7 ' The next morning Raskolnikov wakes up "feeling
bilious, short-tempered and uncharitable."'74 As such, at every
turn, Raskolnikov rebuts each of his own thoughts and impulses
and then even rebuts the rebuttal, thus taking the concept of inner
schism to a whole new implosive dimension.
Similarly, Raskolnikov is plagued with ambivalence toward
every soul in his radius, oscillating between kindness and abuse.
With respect to his associations before the crime, his most obvious
targets are his adoring mother and sister, Dunya, who are both
treacly sycophantic and willing to endure any form of self-sacrifice
for the promising scholar: that is, mother is going blind
embroidering for a mere pittance and Dunya has endured
humiliation as a governess so that they can fund Raskolnikov's
studies. Although Raskolnikov exhibits glimmerings of love and
affection for his family, he also treats them with icy indifference
and at least once, banishes them from his claustrophobic
container. Also, understanding full-well that mother and sister
are themselves nearly impoverished, Raskolnikov guiltily accepts
their monetary offering and then guiltlessly squanders it or gives
it away.
Most horrific of all, however, is the effectual eviction of his
family from his own choices and deliberations: Raskolnikov does
not seriously consider how his crime can and will affect their lives.
He does, however, in true Raskolnikov fashion, rationalize that the
murder is not solely about himself, but rather the spoils of the
robbery can save his sister from a sacrificial marriage to a bad
man.
Sonya, Marmeladov's daughter, provides another bond for
Raskolnikov. For him, she is part of his obsession, his salvation,
and a hybrid - both prostitute and angel. Throughout most of the
novel, Raskolnikov platonically courts her and psychologically
tortures her. Although Sonya's role intensifies after the
commission of the crime, even early on Raskolnikov intuits that
Sonya is to be the catalyst for his regeneration. Despite this,
Raskolnikov does not resist the urge to pulverize her magnificent
spirit.

172. Id. at 34.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 35.
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Another cherished victim is his old friend, Razumikhin, who
for some inexplicable reason is fanatically devoted to the destitute
intellectual.
Raskolnikov conscripts the all-too good natured
Razumikhin into the role of caretaker and mercilessly exploits
him. Although Razumikhin unconditionally loves and believes in
his friend, comes to his rescue with food, new clothes, medicine,
and a doctor, and even nurses him bedside, Raskolnikov
sporadically gives this votary a tongue lashing and frostily pushes
him away.
Two other characters figure into the pre-crime calculus: both
of these men, who have links to Dunya - her past and potential
future - also have causal ties with one another. Such connexity is
quite significant here because Dostoyevsky believes that our past
and future are entangled and that all that we do and have done
bears fruit in the form of future consequences. As discussed later,
this apodictic fact is something that Raskolnikov both embraces
and seeks to bury in deep denial.'
One of the men, Svidrigailov is a sociopathic landowner, who
had employed Dunya to work as his household governess when she
needed money for her brother.'76 Svidrigailov, however, became
infatuated with Dunya and unsuccessfully tried to seduce her.
Svidrigailov's wife, Martha, who overheard some of his lascivious
entreaties but did not realize that the governess was innocent,
ejected Dunya from the house and retaliated with vicious gossip.
When Martha later learns the truth, she befriends Dunya, begs
her forgiveness, and painstakingly labors to undo the harm.
Martha's benevolent crusade leads to Luzhin, whom she
secures for Dunya as a suitor.'
In a letter to her son,
Raskolnikov's mother describes the fairly affluent fiancd as a
"respectable man, just a bit arrogant and on the gloomy side" who
aspires to marry a girl "without a dowry."17 As mom explained,
Luzhin wants "the kind of girl who already knew what poverty
was like; because... a husband must in no way be beholden to his
wife, and it's always far better if the wife views the husband as her
benefactor."'79
Both of these Dunya-linked villains are to some extent
connate: they are both predators that thrive on exploiting,
overpowering, and controlling others. In a sense, they live their
175. See infra notes 333-35 and accompanying text.
176. See BREGER, supra note 8, at 42-44 (suggesting that Svidrigailov is
"Raskolnikov's double" and that he "functions as a representation of impulse

unchecked by morality, as a man without God" and that "just as Marmeladov
runs out the possibilities of dependence and masochism to their end,
Svidrigailov plays out the drama of amorality and self-indulgence").
177. Id. at 30 ("Luzhin is... a crass version of the type who controls others

with obligation and indebtedness; for him this takes the place of love.").
178. DOSTOYEVSKY, supra note 1, at 44-45.
179. Id. at 45.
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lives in the way that Raskolnikov seeks to live just once in that
fragmented instant in which he terminates a human life.
Although Raskolnikov has more contact with Svidrigailov and
Luzhin after the murder, he acquaints himself with them earlier.
Due to his heightened intellect and partly due to his misanthropy,
Raskolnikov, reading between the lines of mother's letter, knows
exactly what those two vipers are all about and works himself into
a murderous frenzy. Later, however, when Raskolnikov confronts
Svidrigailov and Luzhin face to face, he is, as usual, seriously
conflicted, experiencing raw hatred along with morbid fascination.
This propels him to alienate these specimens and also pull them in
close for study.
Before the crime, Raskolnikov feels trapped by his poverty,
his living conditions, and by other people.18 ° He is likewise torn
asunder by a need for isolation and companionship, and even his
definition of both states is paradoxical. That is, Raskolnikov's
social and psychological disabilities render him incapable of and
resistant to human ties, so much so that his pangs of isolation are
in fact more acute not when he is not alone, but when he is
ostensibly engaged with others: when they enter his miserable
garret, when they talk to him, when they nurse him, when they
give to him, when they argue with him, Raskolnikov is simply not
there.
Raskolnikov might be judging, analyzing, disdaining,
insulting, or tolerating, but he is outside of it all and effectively
impenetrable. For him, this kind of aloneness is the desired
sanctuary and a bastille of agony.
One sure thing we can say about Raskolnikov is this: every
fiber in his entire being tells him that he can not indefinitely
endure this dreadful state. Raskolnikov wants change and needs
it desperately. Dostoyevsky's genius is this creation of a human
being, who is both anomalous and uncomfortably familiar. If we
are ruthlessly honest with ourselves (and Dostoyevsky deserves
that), we sense that despite that morass of freakish abnormality,
there is something of Raskolnikov in all of us. If we can handle it,
we begin to not just read, but actually live the novel, and live it as
if we are Raskolnikov by pushing him out while we are compelled
to invite him in. Dostoyevsky also lets us not just read about, but
actually endure, Raskolnikov's mounting cognitive dissonance
with its cathartic crescendo and a coda of meaningful change.
At least unconsciously, Raskolnikov knows what he needs to
sire his own deliverance. Shortly before the crime, Raskolnikov
experiences what has become famous in world literature - his
dream of the suffering horse.
Dostoyevsky underscores the
180. See Atkin, supra note 8, at 265 ("When we are introduced to
[Raskolnikov], he has already been reduced to the lowest level of poverty ....
Clad in rags, so that he was often mistaken for a professional beggar in the
streets, pent up with accumulated bitterness and humiliation .... ").
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momentousness of "[d]reams such as these - the morbid ones [that] invariably remain in the memory long afterwards, and have
a powerful effect on the individual's deranged and already
overstimulated organism. " "' It is this terrible dream that predicts
the future and prescribes a cure.
In the dream, Raskolnikov is a boy visiting the countryside
with his father and passing a tavern, loaded with drunken,
partying peasants. Mikolka, the owner of a large wagon, hitched
to a skinny old horse, invites the rowdies to pile in and go for a
ride. Although it is obvious that the horse cannot drag the
overloaded wagon, Mikolka savagely beats the horse to a pulp.
The incident turns into a self-defeating vicious cycle: the more
Mikolka delivers lashes, the less the horse can budge, and the less
the horse can budge, the more the angered Mikolka delivers the
lashes. When spectators voice their objections, Mikolka yells, "She
belongs to me!"" 2 The mare, Mikolka's "property," senselessly
bludgeoned to death on the spine with a crowbar, emits a "heavy
sigh," and dies."s
In the dream, child Raskolnikov, traumatized and dashing
out from the crowd, makes a futile attempt to save the horse.
Eventually, he lunges at the murderer:
With a howl he forced his way through the crowds toward the little
grey mare, flung his arms round her dead, bloodied muzzle and
kissed it, kissed her on the eyes, on the lips ... then he suddenly
leapt up and rushed at Mikolka, hammering at him with his little
fists. At that point his father, who had been chasing after him for a
long time, finally seized hold of him and carried him away from the
crowd. 84

When Raskolnikov wakes up, he instantly annexes the dream
to the very murder he has been contemplating:
"Oh God!" he exclaimed. "Will I really do it, will I really take an axe
and hit her on the head with it, smash her skull in?... Will I slip
on her warm, sticky blood, break open the lock, steal the money and
tremble; then hide myself,
covered in blood. .. with the axe ....
1 85
Oh, Lord, will I really?"
Psychoanalyst, Breger, points out that in Raskolnikov's "own
interpretation he sees himself as Mikolka, the dream portraying
his plan to kill the aged and useless old pawnbroker."'" While the
dream surely mirrors the atrocity that Raskolnikov is about to

181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.

DOSTOYEVSKY, supra note 1, at 67.
Id. at 70.
Id. at 72.
Id.
Id. at 73.
BREGER, supra note 8, at 31.

2006]

The Therapeutic JurisprudenceConfession

commit, it also prefigures his ultimate regeneration and prescribes
what he needs to do to get there.
There are four Raskolnikovs in this dream: one, the MikolkaRaskolknikov who seeks to assert power over and ownership of
others through the irrational oppression of another's life; two, the
mare-Raskolnikov, who feels helplessly trapped and beaten down;
three, the boy-Raskolnikov, who compassionately leaps forth to try
to spare a life; and four, the father-Raskolnikov, who swoops in to
squelch the boy's heroic benevolence.'87 In the dream, the most
important Raskolnikov in the quadrille is, of course, the boy, who
identifies himself, comes forth, takes responsibility, and tries
(albeit in futility) to right a wrong. He is, after all, the antidote to
Mikolka's murderous tantrum, and he is, like the spirit of
confession, a courageous personification of what is best in human
nature. It is significant that the boy kisses the mare "on the eyes"
and "on the lips," acts which extol both vision and speech as
faculties that assist heartfelt redemption.'88 In essence,
Raskolnikov's soul and psyche need this little boy to "force[] his
way" out.'89 The dream tells Raskolnikov, even before he has
committed the offense, that what he needs to do to change his
entire life is to come forth, confront Mikolka, and confess.
The dream is also prophetic because it is Raskolnikov four,
the father, who prevails by banishing the boy, by rendering him
invisible, by silencing the symbolic confession, and by halting a
humane outburst. It is only after the dream-father has trumped
the dream-boy that Raskolnikov awakens to realize that he is
heading down the Mikolka path and might actually "take an axe"
to bring his horrific project to fruition." The dream, however, is
more significantly a prescription than it is a prognostication. It
counsels Raskolnikov to lash out at his own Mikolka-like instincts,
come clean, and embrace love. As such, even before the crime,
Raskolnikov needs to confess and desperately wants to join the
human race.
B. The Crime
Just about every commentator accepts what is seductively
basic: namely, that Raskolnikov needs to confess because he has

187. But see id. at 31-32 (suggesting that "[slince a dream arises entirely
from the mind of the dreamer, its different characters and emotions represent
different sides of his personality" and that there are three such sides in the
Milolka dream: "Raskolnikov is not only the angry attacker, he is also the
innocent young boy who loves the maternal figure and is horrified at the
violence visited upon her. And he is, as well, the victim, the beaten old mare").
188. DOSTOYEVSKY, supra note 1, at 72.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 73.
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committed a crime."' They have in fact put the cart before the
horse (pun intended). The real truth, and indeed the kernel of
Dostoyevsky's wisdom, is that Raskolnikov commits the crime
because he needs to confess. Raskolnikov's problem before the
murder is that any confession he might make would be ethereally
devoid of content. So, in essence, Raskolnikov murders to fill his
confession with substance. This is the reason why it is virtually
impossible to find in Crime and Punishment a plausible motive for
Raskolnikov's brutal act.
For a long time, scholars have asked why Raskolnikov did
what he did and have answered by adopting one of the
perpetrator's spurious rationalizations for his own crime.9
The
scholarship on and the novel itself posit essentially four possible
motives, and as Dostoyevsky probably intended, all of them are
plainly unconvincing.
Raskolnikov's first putative motive is simply personal: he
murders Alyona Ivanovna because he hates her and there are
undeniably indications of that in Dostoyevsky's portrayal of the
woman and in Raskolnikov's encounters with her. When we first
see her through the starving ex-student's eyes, she is repulsive
and cadaverous: "a tiny, dried-up little old woman of about sixty,
with sharp, hostile eyes, a small, sharp nose and no head
covering." 93 Her "whitish hair" is "abundantly smeared with oil,"
and her "long, thin neck... resemble[s] the leg of a chicken."" It
is, of course, plain that Raskolnikov doesn't particularly like her.
But it is more accurate to say that he negates her as a human
being.
Although Raskolnikov purportedly visits Alyona to pawn his
watch, he is really there to do reconnaissance and plan the attack.
Throughout his dealings with Alyona, he is non-emotional,
business-like, and even mechanical.
This is Raskolnikov's
suppression of any emotional investment in his victim, who to him
is more like a thing of neutral valence - a non-person. When
Raskolnikov departs, he does not acknowledge any hatred for his
Alyona, but rather unleashes it all on himself:
"Oh God! How loathsome all this is! And could I really, could I
really ....
No, its nonsensical, its absurd!" [ile added, firmly,
"Could I really ever have contemplated such a monstrous act? It
191. See, e.g., Cochran, supra note 9, at 357-359 (describing Raskolnikov's
crime, followed by his struggle with his conscience, his contemplation of

suicide, and then his confession). Almost all scholars and commentators focus
on Raskolnikov's need to come clean because he has committed murder.
192. See infra notes 190-213 and accompanying text (discussing
Raskolnikov's putative reasons for murdering the old money-lender).
193. DOSTOYEVSKY, supra note 1, at 9.

194. Id.
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shows what filth my heart is capable of, though! Yes, that's what it
is: filthy, mean, vile, vile!" 95
If anything, what Raskolnikov reviles are his own Mikolka-like
impulses - not this little old lady, who is really nothing to him.
Commentator Peter Lowe's suggestion that Raskolnikov equates
Alyona with all of the oppressive adversity in his life'9 rings true,
but it does not make sense that that is why Raskolnikov decides to
bludgeon her (and her of all people) to death with an axe. After all,
in Raskolnikov's mind, there are all sorts of St. Petersburg
specimens both known and unknown who are equally
culpable and just as ripe for execution.
A second, but related, theory is one with which psychologists
and psychiatrists seem to be quite smitten. They attribute the
murder to Raskolnikov's tortured feelings towards his mother. For
example, Kathleen Garber explains that Raskolnikov needs to
"project inner destructiveness (death instinct) and finds the old
pawnbroker suitable for this purpose"9 7 and elaborates:
She is a harsh, miserly old woman (the bad mother) who treats her
step-sister shamefully.
Thus, Raskolnikov's self-hate becomes
externalized and projected onto the pawnbroker. In killing her, he
commits a symbolic suicide. It was not her death he really sought so
much as relief from his intolerable rage at the introjected "bad
mother" from whom he learned the concept of "bad self" and selfcontempt.'98
Undeniably, Raskolnikov loves and abhors his mother and
unconsciously cordons mother to that wicked Mikolka facet of
himself, but Alyona is not the only conceivable maternal
surrogate. Rather, as Breger has pointed out, Crime and
Punishment is replete with mothers, ones, like the landlady, the
"bad" mother, the "source of food, shelter, and comfort,... whose
care is bound up with anger, fear and guilt" and the landlady's
maid, the "good" mother, who "attends to [Raskolnikov's] needs in
a simple and straightforward manner.""9 Why didn't Raskolnikov
go on a rampage and exterminate all of the mothers in the book?
Essentially, most of the scholarship on Raskolnikov's mother
detect what underlies the obvious - namely, that Raskolnikov

195. Id. at 12-13.
196. Lowe, supra note 8, at 8.
197. Garber, supra note 8, at 16.
198. Id.
199. BREGER, supra note 8, at 23; see also Hutzler, supra note 8, at 337
("[Aifter murdering the pawnbroker and her daughter (symbolically mother
and sister?) Raskolnikov realizes that in this act he has cut himself off from
his mother and sister."); Kiremidjian, supra note 8 (Raskolnikov lives out his
matricidal impulses); Robert B. Lower, On Raskolnikov's Dreams in
Dostoyevsky's Crime and Punishment, 17 J. AMERICAN PSYCHOANALYTIC
Assoc. 728 (1969) (Raskolnikov acts out his sadomasochistic oedipal fantasy).
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despises the Mikolka-self and the mothers of the world that
birthed this evil Mikolka. °° At the same time, Raskolnikov
cherishes Mikolka because only Mikolka's evil can activate boyRaskolnikov and conceive what he so desperately needs - the
emergence of a regenerative process.
The third putative motive assigned to the impoverished
0 1
Raskolnikov even tries to persuade
Raskolnikov is monetaryY
himself that murder, along with the robbery, is his logical
economic escape hatch. There are even scholars, like Dr. Atkin,
who call this a "social crime" and argue that "[hiad Raskolnikov
not been a ragged, starving ex-student whose sister was about to
prostitute herself for his benefit, no murder would have been
committed, and his youthful ambitions would have taken a
different course altogether."2 ' For Atkin and others, Raskolnikov,
who has "already been reduced to the lowest level of poverty," feels
as if he is "driven into a cage like a rat to starve to death" and
believes that only Alyona's bounty can set him free."°
Dostoyevsky, however, lets us know that none of that is true.
While Raskolnikov is in the throes of plotting, he ventures
into a pub and eavesdrops on a conversation in which two men are
coincidentally discussing Alyona and what a great idea it would be
to kill her and steal her money. These men, however, do not
envision pocketing her wealth, but rather envision altruistically
disseminating it to those that are poor, sick, and needy:
Hundreds, possibly even thousands of lives that could be set on the
right road; dozens of families saved from poverty, breakup, ruin,
depravity, the venereal hospitals - and all of that with her money.
If one were to kill her and take her money, in order with its help to
devote oneself to the service of all mankind and the common cause:
what do you think - wouldn't one petty little crime like that be
atoned for by all those thousands of good deeds? Instead
2 4 of one life
- thousands of lives rescued from corruption and decay.
It is here that Raskolnikov has an epiphany, believing that
"predestination" is at work and that "inside his own head there
2 0
"
had been engendered... precisely those very same thoughts."
the
adopting
This scene is poignantly one in which Raskolnikov,
200. Id.
201. See Atkin, supra note 8 (blaming Raskolnikov's crime on poverty and
other social factors).
202. Id. at 256-57.
203. Id. at 365. In one of his meetings with Raskolnikov, Porfiry, the
examining magistrate, suggests a monetary motive for the crime. See
DOSTOYEVSKY, supra note 1, at 315 ("[Tlhen is it really possible that you
might also have decided - oh, because of some everyday setback or financial
difficulty, let's say.... to step across an obstacle?... Well, by robbing and
murdering someone, for example?...").
204. DOSTOYEVSKY,supra note 1, at 80.
205. Id. at 81.
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conversation as his own inner dialogue, signs on to a supposedly
more altruistic incentive - that of casting his abomination into a
noble act of charity. What he identifies with here is not the
sacrifice of Alyona for his own or even Dunya's sake, but for the
betterment of humankind.2 ® In essence, evoking the dream of the
dead horse, this is the boy-Raskolnikov, who can radiate a sordid
tragedy with beneficence.
While the overheard conversation and Raskolnikov's reaction
to it suggest that the crime is not propelled by a desire for
economic self-betterment, the same thing is borne out by
Raskolnikov's behavior throughout the entire novel. To say that
Raskolnikov is not materialistic is technically a litotes because one
of the few consistent things about the supposedly destitute scholar
is that whenever he does get his hands on a few coins, he almost
instantly gives them to some needy subject, or just throws them
207
away.
It is also apparent that the murder is not about money
because after all that dreadful work, Raskolnikov exhibits no
interest whatsoever in the spoils of the robbery: he hides the purse
and valuables under a brick and never even bothers to retrieve
them. At his trial, it comes out that Raskolnikov failed to
"remember the details of any of the goods he had stolen" and was
"even mistaken as to their number." "° Also, he had never once
even tried to peek into the purse, and by effectually abandoning it,
"the largest denominations had suffered serious water damage."2 °
In short, Raskolnikov puts himself through living hell for
something, but it is surely not for material gain.
The fourth putative motive is philosophical - Raskolnikov's
Napoleonic theory - probably borrowed from Napoleon III's book,
The Life of Julius Caesar, which was popular among the Russian
intelligentsia at the time Dostoyevsky was writing Crime and
Punishment.210 Commentators have suggested that Raskolnikov,
suffering from deep-seated feelings of inferiority, conjured up this

206. See Burnham, supra note 3, at 1231 (describing the "selfless theory" of
why Raskolnikov killed and suggesting that "Raskolnikov figures that since
the pawnbroker is old and rich from preying on human suffering, there is
nothing wrong with killing her so that he can use her money to relieve
suffering.").
207. See, e.g., DOSTOYEVSKY, supra note 1, at 140 ("Making an automatic
movement with his hand, he suddenly felt the twenty-copeck piece that was
clutched in it. He unclenched his fist, stared fixedly at the little coin and, with
*a swing of his arm, hurled it into the water..."); see also infra Part V.B
(describing Sonya refuting the putative monetary motive for the crime).
208. DOSTOYEVSKY, supra note 1, at 638.

209. Id.
210. See Burnham, supra note 3, at 1231 (suggesting that the "selfish" or
"Napoleonic" theory comes from Napoleon III's 1865 book).
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ideology prefiguring Nietzsche, and murdered to proclaim his own
greatness and superiority. 1'
The theory, in an article that Raskolnikov authored after
leaving the university, suggests that there are certain people in
the world who "have a perfect right to commit all sorts of atrocities
and crimes, and that it's as if the law did not apply to them."12
Despite the fact that Raskolnikov did not put his name on the
paper, but had merely initialed it, Porfiry, the examining
magistrate, manages to find it, read it, and describe it:
The whole point of his article is that the human race is divided into
the "ordinary" and the "extraordinary". The ordinary must live in
obedience and do not have the right to break the law, because, well,
because they're ordinary, you see. The extraordinary, on the other
hand, have the right to commit all sorts of crimes and break the law
in all sorts of ways precisely because they're extraordinary.
Porfiry taunts Raskolnikov with the article and Raskolnikov
defends it, stating that "all the law-makers and guiding spirits of
mankind, starting with the most ancient ones, and continuing
with the Lycurguses, the Solons, the Mahomets, the Napoleons
and so on, were all every one of them criminals" because they, "in
propounding a new law.., were violating an old one that was held
in sacred esteem by society." 4 Porfiry, playfully suggests that
Raskolnikov committed a crime to prove that he was one of those
great extraordinary Napoleon men:
What I mean is, sir, that when you were writing your article, it
couldn't just possibly have been, could it - ha, ha! - that you too
considered yourself - oh, just the merest bit - to be one of the
"extraordinary" people who can say a new word - in the sense
you've explained .... 215
Here Dostoyevsky, speaking through Porfiry, summarizes and
deflates the conjectured motives for the crime, essentially
admonishing that its perpetration was neither monetary nor
altruistic nor philosophical. 16 Porfiry (and Dostoyevsky as well)
mocks Raskolnikov's distended equation between the slaying of an
old lady with the sacrifice of soldiers under Napoleon's command.
In essence, this pivotal scene on a literal level tells us not just that
211. See Atkin, supra note 8, at 271 (suggesting that we follow the "fuller
development of Raskolnikov's ideas by Nietzsche[,]" who "also envisages a
society which is divided into two distinct classes, an aristocratic ruling caste
(the 'free spirits') and an inferior slave class" and that "Raskolnikov's theory is
thus seen as a foreshadowing of the ideology of a fascist society.").
212. DOSTOYEVSKY, supra note 1, at 307 (Porfiry's description).
213. Id. at 308.
214. Id. at 309.
215. Id. at 315.
216. See also infra Part V.B (discussing how Sonya also pokes holes in
Raskolnikov's self-professed motives for his crime).
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Porfiry knows "who done it," but also that Raskolnikov's claimed
rationalizations are disingenuous.
But if we closely inspect the sparring between murderer and
examining magistrate, Raskolnikov unwittingly exposes the forces
at work inside himself. Raskolnikov tells Porfiry that only the
ordinary people make mistakes, that at times "a certain
capriciousness of temperament" deludes them into believing that
they are one of the extraordinary "progressive" types, and that
such posturing does not "represent any significant threat."217
According to Raskolnikov, the ordinary caste has its own code of
self-flagellation:
Of course, it would do them no harm to give them a thrashing now
and then, to punish them for getting carried away and to remind
them of their rightful place, but no more than that; one doesn't even
need a whip-master for the job - they'll whip themselves, because
they're very well-behaved; some of them will perform this service for
one another, while others do it for themselves with their own
hands ....
Moreover, they impose various public acts of penitence
on themselves - the effect is both splendid and edifying and, in
short, you have nothing to worry about .... 218
What Raskolnikov does here is foreshadow his own regenerative
evolution, comprised of "mistake," confession, "acts of penitence,"
and finally "splendid" edification.219 Beneath the surface of this,
Raskolnikov concedes that he himself is "ordinary," or at least that
there is no genuine demarcation between the ordinary and
extraordinary, and that what he seeks to bring about for himself is
a good whipping.
When we look at the crime itself, we see that it adheres to his
own recipe: Raskolnikov makes mistakes, yet charges forth to
make more mistakes so that he can get caught and be flagellated.
Raskolnikov's crime is indistinguishable from his confession, and
remember that even before he conceived of the crime, he had
already effectually confessed by planting evidence against himself
by making sure that his self-incriminating Napoleonic treatise was
published and out there to be discovered.
The murder begins when Raskolnikov comes to Alyona's
apartment with a phony silver cigarette-case to pawn. It is then
that he "los[es] his head and almost make[s] a fatal blunder," and
soon thereafter things spiral out of control.22 After bashing in
Alyona's head, Raskolnikov fumbles for her keys and starts
haphazardly grabbing at valuables. Although he had it planned so
that he could arrive when Alyona's step-sister would be absent,
Lizaveta unexpectedly barges in and stares at the dead body. As
217.
218.
219.
220.

DOSTOYEVSKY, supra note 1, at 311-12.
Id. at 312.
Id.
Id. at 92.

The John MarshallLaw Review

[40:41

Lizaveta backs away with hands raised, Raskolnikov shatters her
skull as well.
With all his supposed meticulous conniving, Raskolnikov has
mistakenly claimed a second, unanticipated victim and this totally
unnerves him. He becomes confused, cannot finish confiscating
the lucre, and instead mistakenly retards his own escape by
obsessing over the blood on his weapon, hands, and clothes. In the
interim, two men startle him by banging on the apartment door.
Raskolnikov almost gets caught, but hides until they leave, and
then makes his get away.
Although the whole thing is embarrassingly clumsy and
amateurish, Raskolnikov might have gotten away with it."2 But
here Raskolnikov made a serious, although not necessarily fatal,
mistake. That is, he failed to even consider that the old miser
could have some record of her customers and that police would, of
course, call such folks for questioning. While the mere fact of his
being the victim's customer is not enough unto itself to convict
him, it would at least guarantee that Raskolnikov would have a
chance to wrangle with the police, who might in turn help him
consummate his true desire by squeezing out that blessedly
damned confession. In short, Raskolnikov, like the "ordinary"
man, makes his mistakes, and secures his own whipping. He does
not murder because he hates either Alyona or his mother, because
he wants money, or because he wants to prove his own Napoleonic
stature. He plans and commits a crime to secure content for a
confession that will serve as the precursor to punishment and
eventually repentance.
It is no coincidence that while marching to Alyona's with the
concealed axe, Raskolnikov likens himself to a convict "being led to
the scaffold."222 He knows where he is headed and unconsciously
The profound paradox,
grasps why this is his destination.
however, inheres in the fact that his thanatotic act is also the
catalyst to life-affirmation. For him, only a deathblow will deliver
that therapeutic re-birth. For him, only evil Mikolka can awaken
the compassionate little boy.
C. After the Crime
After the crime, Raskolnikov becomes even more of a selfsaboteur. He is tortured by an overwhelming desire to get caught
and confess. When Raskolnikov returns to his room right after the
crime, Raskolnikov returns the axe to its spot under the yard
keeper's bench. But he admits to himself that if the yard keeper
221. See id. at 181 (Razumikhin, discussing the crime, states: "['In my
opinion, he's neither skilled nor experienced, and he's probably a firsttime .... If, on the other hand, you assume he was inexperienced, it looks as
though it was only chance that saved him from disaster...
222. Id. at 90.
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had been there to greet him, "he would probably have simply
handed him the axe."2 Early on, Raskolnikov has yearnings for a
witness or for his commission of a mistake that will dutifully
betray him.
Later, in his own room, Raskolnikov obsesses over clues that
he might have overlooked, which is something that he both dreads
and desires:
A strange thought suddenly came into his head: what if all his
clothes were covered in blood, what if there were many stains, only
he could not see them, could not find out where they were because
his reason had grown feeble, broken apart... his mind grown
darkened ....Suddenly he remembered that there had been blood
on the purse, too. "Ah! That means there must be blood in my
pocket, too, because I shoved the purse into it while it was still wet!"
as
In a flash he turned out the pocket, and in its lining discovered,
224
he had known he would - traces of blood, whole stains!
Before he decides to stuff his spoils under a brick, Raskolnikov
considers where he can hide the blood-stained scraps and comes
up with crannies that are likely to be discovered, like the
household stove, "the first place they'll start rummaging about
in."2" Part of him wants to plant evidence against himself to
ensure that the authorities will get hold of it.
Right after the crime, there is a disturbing coincidence: the
police summon Raskolnikov to the station, but unbeknownst to
him, it has nothing to do with the murders, but rather involves his
debt to his landlady. En route, Raskolnikov, who is "trembling,"
and whose head is "spinning and aching with fever," fears that he
might "go and say something stupid" and then decides that if they
do ask him about "it," he might just get it over with and tell them
everything. 226 He dreads and desires confession.
While in the police station, contending with the landlady
issues, Raskolnikov has an impulse to go over to one of the officials
and "tell[] him everything that had happened the day before, down
to the last detail, and then tak[e] him to his lodgings and show[]
him the gold objects in the corner, inside the hole."2 7 In fact, this
urge to do himself in is "so strong that he actually [stands] up in
order to put it into action."228 Then, when he overhears officials
discussing the Alyona and Lizaveta murders, he swoons, drawing
suspicion to himself. When he regains consciousness and leaves
the station, he knows that he has now graduated to suspect status

223.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id.

106.
111.
112.
115.
127.
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and even anticipates a search of his room. In a sense, he marches
out like someone who has secured a promotion.
From there on, Raskolnikov, wracked by guilt, is consumed
with a desire to be ensnared and confess, and his actions become
increasingly reckless and self-incriminating. Raskolnikov meets a
police clerk in a bar and sardonically confesses to the crime and
then pretends it was all joke. Unable to leave well-enough alone,
Raskolnikov even returns to the scene of the crime, goes right up
to the workmen repairing Alyona's apartment, questions them
about the blood on the floor, and makes a memorable ruckus,
which he hopes will be reported to the police. After that episode,
Raskolnikov, somewhat relieved, "know[s] for a certainty that it
would all very soon be over."2
Later, he seeks to ascertain
whether, Porfiry Petrovich, the examining magistrate knows that
"[he] went to that old witch's apartment... and asked about the
blood. " "°
One of Raskolnikov's main partners in this pre-confession
tango is indeed Porfiry, who is assigned to the case. Porfiry, who
is highly intelligent and also a natural psychologist, presents a
formidable match for the ex-law student, and it is he who appears
to know just how to manipulate his suspect." In their first long
confrontation, Porfiry, revealing that he is familiar with the article
on the Napoleonic theory, toys with Raskolnikov's feelings of
inferiority, mocks his grandiose justifications for crime, and then
wacks his suspect with a blunt hint that he knows the horrific
secret.
Right after the first of three significant tangles with Porfiry,
Raskolnikov meets an artisan on the street, who stops and calls
him a "murderer."32 While initially unclear how much of this
encounter is real or hallucinatory, what it foretells is that Porfiry
will be one of the catalysts to outed truth - that his sessions with
Porfiry will lead to Raskolnikov's acknowledgment that he has
succumbed to the Mikolka within.

229. Id. at 210.
230. Id. at 293.
231. See generally Burnham, supra note 3, at 1241-42 (describing the role of
examining magistrate, which has "no exact equivalent ... in any Englishspeaking country."). Burnham explains that "these investigators were
attached to and considered to be members of the local court, even being
qualified to sit as a judge in that court on cases that they themselves had not
investigated." Id. at 1241. Also, individuals like Porfiry "had the power to
subpoena any member of the public to appear before them to give evidence, as

well as the power to visit crime scenes, document other evidence, and order
searches and arrests." Id.

Significantly, "any evidence taken before them,

including confessions, had the status of judicial evidence if taken in strict
compliance with the specified procedures." Id.
232. DOSTOYEVSKY, supra note 1, at 324.
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Although Raskolnikov loathes him, he nevertheless cannot
stay away from Porfiry, who is both nemesis and co-conspirator.
While Porfiry seeks to win, out, and then exile the MikolkaRaskolnikov, he understands (and Raskolnikov does too) that
inquisitor and suspect are in cahoots, that both seek the same end
- a confession. Porfiry works not through overt coercion, but
through manipulation and by giving Raskolnikov enough rope
with which to hang himself.
In the second of three significant interviews, Porfiry makes a
real breakthrough and brings Raskolnikov to the very edge of selfincrimination. It occurs soon after the mysterious artisan accuses
Raskolnikov of murder. Raskolnikov, filled with delusions of
grandeur, decides to bless Porfiry with a visit. But upon arrival at
the police station, Raskolnikov is "rather surprised that it [takes]
so long for anyone to attend to him" and that "people [come and
go], seeming not to take the slightest interest in him."'33 When
Porfiry admits the now deflated Raskolnikov, he is cordial and
welcoming, and definitely in control, telling his suspect, "[wle've
all the time in the world, sir, all the time in the world."" 4
In the course of this second meeting, Raskolnikov becomes
fiercely enraged and accuses Porfiry of exploiting a hackneyed
technique, one used by all state investigators, designed to make a
suspect feel confident before "suddenly hit[ting] him bang on the
head in a thoroughly unexpected way with the most fatal and
dangerous question.""6 From there, Raskolnikov begs Porfiry to
interrogate him, shouting "to put it bluntly: be so good as either to
ask your questions or let me go, this instant ... and if you are
going to question me, then do it according to the proper form,
sir!"23 ' Although Porfiry appears somewhat shaken and "babble[es]
on persistently," he is still performing, still in control. 37 Porfiry
actually tells Raskolnikov point blank what he is up to: "But what
good are formal methods? You know, in many cases, formal
methods are just rubbish. Sometimes one gains more from simply
having a friendly chat."'
From there Porfiry elaborates on his
methods, which are not in the legal textbooks, but instead are
designed
to
give
him
"evidence
that
looks
as
straightforward as two times two" 9 and flexibly accommodate the
233. Id. at 394.
234. Id. at 397.
235. Id. at 398.
236. Id. at 399.
237. Id. at 402.
238. Id. at 401.
239. Id. at 403. See also Burnham, supra note 3, at 1233-34 (describing the
rules of evidence in place at the time of CRIME AND PUNISHMENT). According
to Burnham, "a person could be convicted only if there was complete proof,"
which was "possible by means of a judicial confession by the criminal
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idiosyncrasies of each case:
Say, I leave a certain gentleman completely alone: I don't arrest him
and I don't trouble him, but I make damn sure that every hour and
every minutes he knows, or at least suspects, that I know
everything, the whole seamy story, and that I'm keeping an eye on
him night and day, watching him unremittingly, and if he's
conscious of the never-ending suspicion and terror in which I'm
keeping him, I tell you, sir, he'll go off into a whirl, he'll come
running of his own accord, and he may even do something that will
look like two times two, and will, as it were, have a mathematical
appearance - that's always most gratifying.?A
In all of this, Porfiry confesses what he is in the very process of
doing to Raskolnikov and prognosticates the precise effect it will
have on his suspect, who will not and can not escape. Porfiry
understands that Raskolnikov can not "abscond psychologically,"
because what he needs is to be trapped enough to come clean."'
Porfiry, likening his suspect to a moth near a candle-flame, tells
Raskolnikov, "that's the way he'll be with me, hovering, circling
around me like a moth at a lighted candle." 242 For pawky Porfiry,
such a suspect will eventually "come to the station himself and
ask: 'Why are they taking so long to arrest me?'"'
At this juncture, Raskolnikov, like the moth circling into the
Porfiry flame, tells him directly:
It is clear to me now that you definitely suspect me of having
murdered that old woman and her sister Lizaveta. For my part, I
will tell you that I grew heartily sick of all this a long time ago. If
you believe that you have the right to prosecute me, then please do
so; if you are going to arrest me, arrest me.2
From there, canny Porfiry tries to placate his victim by assuming a
maternal tone and giving him the information that he seeks:
Porfiry mentions Raskolnikov's little visit to the murder scene to
ask about the blood. After Porfiry shifts similes, now likening his
moth to a "child that wants to play with matches," Raskolnikov
begins to beg for incineration and release: "Arrest me, search my
lodgings, do as you please, but do it according to the rulebook .... 2 When Raskolnikov is just about to walk out, Porfiry
taunts him with a little surprise in the form of mysterious
evidence behind a locked door. It seems that this could have been
the coup de grace that expels what both inquisitor and suspect
defendant" and "[tihe only other practical form of complete proof was the
consistent testimony of two eyewitnesses." Id. at 1233-34.
240. DOSTOYEVSKY, supra note 1, at 404.
241. Id. at 405.
242. Id.
243. Id. at 408.
244. Id.
245. Id. at 415.
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desire - the confession. Here, however, something transpires that
Dostoyevsky denominates "a denouement" and while it effectively
derails the cathartic ouster, it also precipitates what will be
Raskolnikov's therapeutic regeneration."46

V. DOSTOYEVSKY'S LESSONS IN THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE
At the end of his second interview with Porfiry, Raskolnikov
fails to discover what is behind the door. Almost deus ex machina,
there is a sudden commotion, caused by Nikolai, the apartment
painter, who insists on confessing to Raskolnikov's crime. Porfiry,
forced to shift his ken to Nikolai, the false-confessor, releases
Raskolnikov and in so doing, admonishes, "we'll be seeing each
other again."" The astute Porfiry knows that Nikolai is innocent
and is unreliably taking credit for a crime that he did not commit.
It is at this juncture that Dostoyevsky begins to deliver his real
lesson on criminal justice, confessions, and therapeutic
jurisprudence.
A. Porfiry's Therapeutic Jurisprudence
Through Nikolai, Dostoyevsky presents a different species
that can and does infiltrate the criminal justice system - one who
falsely confesses.
In some respects, the false confessor is
reminiscent of Raskolnikov before the murder: Nikolai, like
Raskolnikov, apparently harbors a free-floating compulsion to
confess. But, unlike Raskolnikov, Nilolai does not have to commit
an offense to fill his confession with content, but rather does his
atoning by eloping with someone else's crime.
Porfiry (and Dostoyevsky as well) sense that the Nikolai types
imperil criminal investigations by effectually painting over the
truth.
The examining magistrate, who describes Nikolai as
someone who just "wants to 'accept his suffering,'" knows that he
is "not our man.""' Nikolai is linked to Raskolnikov's theoretical
race of "ordinary" men because he tends to self-flagellate.249
Nikolai is all about punishment, but without a crime. Nikolai,
however, is the very antithesis to Sonya. This comes across when
Sonya, accused of a crime that she did not commit, declines to cave
in and falsely confess. This occurs when Luzhin, Dunya's fianc6,
tries to frame Sonya for theft, presents witnesses, and even pulls
246. Id. at 417.
247. Id. at 421.
248. Id. at 543. See also BROOKS, supra note 67, at 6 ("Unless the content of
the confession can be verified by other means, thus substantiating its
trustworthiness, it may be false - false to fact, if true to some other sense of
guilt. The law records many instances of false confessions - and no doubt
many have gone unrecorded.").
249. See supra notes 217-18 and accompanying text (describing how the
ordinary man seeks self-flagellation).

The John MarshallLaw Review

[40:41

the stolen money from her pocket.u"
Sonya, however,
unrelentingly proclaims her innocence.
Through this scene, Dostoyevsky suggests that not everyone
is a Nikolai or a Raskolnikov, that not all souls tropistically lean
toward confession. Porfiry, who is not privy to this scene, would,
of course, understand this and realize that in an imperfect legal
system, a false accuser, like lawyer Luzhin, can "serve up" that
perfect evidence or "nice, mathematical formula like two times
two" and thus, even foster a false conviction.25" ' Porfiry must sadly
acquiesce in the fallibility of the criminal justice system and in the
imperfections of his own vocation.252
Porfiry is masterful, but also tragically trapped, and he knows
it. He understands that getting confessions is tricky business and
that he must be cautiously adept at sifting the genuine from the
ersatz. After Nikolai falsely confesses, Raskolnikov tells the
examining magistrate that his job is "comical" because after
Nikolai claims to be the murderer, Porfiry is now forced into
"picking him to little pieces again, telling him that he's lying, that
he's not the murderer. "2" Porfiry understands that "comedy" all
too well, knows that although he has been handed that "direct and
irrefutable proof' in the form of Nikolai's self incrimination, such
evidence is unreliable laquer and that he must begin the task of

250. See Burnham, supra note 3, at 1239 ("Dostoyevsky also cleverly
demonstrates the perversity of the formal evidence system in the extended
scene with Sonya, in which Luzhin tries to frame her for theft with what
would be 'complete evidence' under the law of the time").
251. DOSTOYEVSKY, supra note 1, at 405.
252. In THE HOUSE OF THE DEAD, there is one man, who is accused and
convicted of murdering his father so that he can "get his hands on his
inheritance." DosTOYEvsKY, supra note 5, at 37. His father's "body was found
in a ditch" and "tilt was dressed and neatly arranged, the grey-haired head
had been cut off and laid against the torso" and "under the head the murderer
had placed a pillow." Id. The convict "had made no confession; had been
stripped of his nobility and government service rank, and had been sentenced
to twenty years' deportation and penal servitude." Id. It later turns out,
however, that although "the facts were so clear that there could be no doubt
about [his guilt]," this convict was innocent: "the true perpetrators of the crime
had apparently been found and had confessed" after the one that was falsely
convicted "had [already] suffered ten years of penal servitude for no reason."
Id. at 391-92. The narrator comments that there is "[nlo need to expatiate on
the tragic profundity of this case, on the young life ruined by such a dreadful
accusation." Id. at 392.
253. DOSTOYEVSKY, supra note 1, at 421-22. Brooks asks:
What is the truth of confession? Doesn't the requirement to confess
suggest that there is always more than enough guilt to go around since indeed once initiated, confession produces guilt as well as
dissipating it? You may find yourself confessing to something else,
something other than the supposed referent of your confession. You
may damn yourself even as you seek to exculpate yourself.
BROOKS, supra note 67, at 6.
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chipping away at it.2 " Significantly, when Raskolnikov ultimately
delivers the true confession, he does not come to Porfiry. Rather,
Raskolnikov gifts what is to some extent the fruit of Porfiry's labor
to someone else - a police underling. In so doing, Dostoyevsky
tells us what Porfiry ostensibly has come to accept- that his
dream, hope and vision of that perfect, unequivocal truth will
never and can never land in his lap.
The concerns in Crime and Punishment mirror those of the
United States Supreme Court in its decisions from the early Due
Process Clause era to the present. Both Dostoyevsky and the
Court focus on the crucial distinction between what is voluntary
and what is coerced." The Court, however, believes that through
its judicial decisions it can affect law enforcement conduct and
thus, increase the likelihood that uncoerced confessions are the
ones admitted into evidence. The Russian novelist, with his own
personal insight into criminal justice, agrees that the law (and
society) covets a voluntary, uncoerced, confession and agrees that
such a thing exists, but he does not believe that any legal system
or law enforcement official can ever really extract it.
As discussed above, at early common law, courts excluded
coerced confessions from evidence because they believed them to
be untrustworthy.2 "
Certain commentators, like Inbau, have
suggested that reliability is the only benchmark and that
interrogators need ask one question: "Is what I am about to do, or
say, apt to make an innocent person confess." 7 Through Porfiry's
encounter with Nikolai, the apartment painter, Dostoyevsky
shows us that law enforcement need "do, or say" little or next to
nothing to yank self-incrimination out of an innocent man. In
essence, Dostoyevsky implicitly understood what Chief Justice
Warren expressed in Miranda - namely, that police questioning
is inherently coercive, and that the psychological pressure is

254. DOSTOYEVSKY, supra note 1, at 403; see also BROOKS, supra note 67, at
21-22 (asking "how can someone make a false confession?"). Brooks explains:
Precisely because the false referentiality of confession may be secondary
to the need to confess: a need produced by the coercion of interrogation
or by the subtler coercion of the need to stage a scene of exposure as the
only propitiation of accusation, including self-accusation for being in a
scene of exposure. Or, as Talmudic law has recognized for millennia,
confession may be the product of the death-drive, the production of
incriminating acts to assure punishment or even self-annihilation, and
hence inherently suspect because in contradiction to the basic human
instinct for self-preservation.

Id.
255. See generally supra Part III.
256. See supra Part III.A.
257. INBAU ET AL., supra note 73, at 217; see also supra notes 71-75 and
accompanying text (discussing Inbau and others that favor giving law
enforcement maximum leeway).
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omnipresent.'
For the Miranda Court, it is this intrinsically
coercive atmosphere that necessitates restraints on the police to
assure that individuals are not being compelled to incriminate
themselves in violation of the Fifth Amendment. For Dostoyevsky,
however, when it comes to dealings with law enforcement, that
inherent coercion, which either inspires a false confession or (as
discussed below) nullifies a true confession, can not be cured or
even tempered.
In short, for Dostoyevsky, any confession
extracted solely by a law enforcement official is a meaningless
event.
Even after the dreadful demolition of Miranda, the Supreme
Court has at least paid lip service to its condemnation of coercive
tactics and its aim to reduce the risk of admitting such involuntary
confessions.259 In the recent Seibert decision, when the Court
distinguished Elstad, it said that in Elstad the officer did not
offend the Constitution because he did not extinguish the choice
between speech and silence.2" The Seibert Court indicated that
the very heart of what at least theoretically remains of Miranda is
meaningful choice and the goal of reducing the risk that choiceless
confessions are treated as evidence that looks as straightforward
as "two times two.""' Dostoyevsky, however, knew that police
officials can never present a suspect with a truly viable choice.
When the United States Supreme Court clarified that the
Sixth Amendment right to counsel had survived Miranda as a
distinct control on police interrogation, it at first appeared to
delete voluntariness and coercion from the equation.
For
example, in Massiah, the Court rejected the relevance of the
argument that the already indicted Massiah was not in custody or
subjected to official pressure2" and in Brewer, declined to evaluate
whether Williams' self incriminating statements were coerced or
involuntary because that Sixth Amendment right to counsel was
simply a "different" kind of protection.2"
Later, in the context of the Henry and Kuhlman decisions, the
Court indicated that coercion or the "deliberate" elicitation of

258. Miranda, 384 U.S. 436; see also supra notes 103-107 and accompanying
text.
259. See supra Part II.B; see also BROOKS, supra 67 at 5 ("The Supreme
Court of the United States has worried about [the] problem and sought to
erect procedural safeguards against the coerced confession, yet it is not clear
that in the day-to-day administration of justice - pursued in the police
precinct, not the Court's marble chambers - these safeguards make much
difference.").
260. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600 (distinguishing Elstad, 470 U.S. 298).
261. DosToYEvsKY, supra note 1, at 405.
262. See generally supra Part ILI.C.
263. Massiah, 333 U.S. at 206.
264. Brewer, 430 U.S. at 398; see also supra notes 126-36 and accompanying
text.
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incriminating statements can factor into the Sixth Amendment
calculus. ' The Court putatively reconciled those two decisions by
characterizing the law enforcement tactic in Henry as an active
"voice... encourage[ing] conversation" and in Kuhlman as a
passive "ear" simply recording the conversation."
For
Dostoyevsky, none of that means a damn thing: the Russian
novelist, himself once imprisoned in Siberia, understood full well
that the human impulse to self-incriminate can be over powering,
and that the mere presence of even a supposedly passive, receptive
ear, especially for one effectually exiled in jail, is tantamount to
active encouragement. One prime example of this is in House of
the Dead, Dostoyevsky's biographical account of years spent in a
Siberian prison, in which he portrays prisoners regularly spilling
their guts and divulging their own offenses to each other at the
drop of a hat."'
For Dostoyevsky, any confession that any law enforcement
agent extracts is always involuntary and coerced - at least under
his understanding of what those words mean. As discussed below,
such a confession - be it true or be it false - serves no real
purpose.
If Dostoyevsky were alive today and in law school
studying the Supreme Court confession cases under the Due
Process Clause and the Fifth and Sixth Amendments, he might
commend the attempted proscription of the kind of coercive tactics
that lead to the undesirable involuntary admissions, but he would
seriously doubt whether any imposed constraints could eradicate
the culprit. Porfiry makes peace with precisely this sense of
futility during his third and final interview with Raskolnikov.
Professor Richard H. Weisberg, who is pretty rough on
Porfiry, portrays him as "fascinated by the criminal mind, perhaps
even envious of it, plays a game of life and death within the
context of a perfectly respectable professional position," and
creates a situation where "[tihe lines between lawyer and criminal
start to blur."" According to Weisberg, Porfiry ends up betraying
the very system he serves by depriving the state of its appropriate
penalty:
Porfiry, having totally dominated Raskolnikov in the pretrial
interviews, has no enduring personal need to see the defendant pay
the supreme penalty for what was, after all, at least one
premeditated murder. The inquisitor therefore deletes from his
265. See supra notes 137-48 and accompanying text (discussing Henry, 477
U.S. 264 and Kuhlman, 477 U.S. 436).
266. Kuhlman, 477 U.S. at 461 (Burger, J. concurring); see also supra notes
146-48 and accompanying text.
267. See DOSTOYEVSKY, supra note 5; see also supra notes 4-7 and
accompanying text and note 249 (discussing the prisoner in THE HOUSE OF
THE DEAD, who was falsely convicted of parricide).
268. WEISBERG, supra note 8, at 54.
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dossier (and hence keeps from the procurator) his firm insight into
the utterly intellectualized nature of the crime. At the trial,
Raskolnikov is presented as just another starving student, and thus
deserving of a sharply mitigated sentence in exile.269
Here what Weisberg depicts as Porfiry's flaws are really his
virtues.270 In fact, Porfiry personifies what a legal system can at
What Dostoyevsky reveals in that third
its best accomplish.
meeting is that Porfiry, even after all the psychological torture
unleashed on his suspect, has himself evolved, has gained insight
into and genuine compassion for this ex-student with his
Napoleonic theories.27 ' It is Porfiry's change of heart that paves
the way for what Weisberg has derogated as an undeserved
"sharply mitigated sentence in exile."272 In turn, it is that reduced
(or rather merciful) punishment that helps engender Raskolnikov's
ultimate rehabilitative transformation.
It is also revealed in this climactic third encounter that
Porfiry has surrendered to the reality of how little any system of
how terribly
justice can really achieve and how meager pedestrian - his own role actually is in the grand scheme. At this
last meeting, Porfiry, now ostensibly humbled, dispenses with his
cat and mouse routine or the ploy that Professor Burnham has
likened to "vintage Columbo," 273 and instead interacts with
Raskolnikov as candidly and as fairly as is humanly possible.
Porfiry visits Raskolnikov's room with a "serious and troubled
expression" that "seemed to twitch with sadness," causing
Raskolnikov to reflect that "[hie had never so far seen such an
expression on Porfiry's face, and had not suspected him to be
capable of it."274 Although Raskolnikov believes that Porfiry is
about to tweak him once more, Porfiry assures him that "it is
Porfiry tells
better for us to be candid with each other."2 71
Raskolnikov that he knows that he is the murderer, asks him to
"file a plea of guilty," explains that "[t]hat would be countless
times better for you, and better for me, too - because then it
would be over and done with, "2 76 and then promises leniency:
[Hiow can you ask why you should file a plea of guilty? Have you
any idea what a reduction in your sentence that would mean?...
And I swear to God himself that I'll fabricate a thing or two and
arrange it with the authorities so that your plea will come as

269. Id.
270. See generally supra note 156 (describing those scholars and
commentators who have disagreed with Weisberg's perspective on Porfiry).
271. DOSTOYEVSKY, supra note 1, at 403.
272. WEISBERG, supra note 8, at 54.
273. Burnham, supra note 3, at 1245.
274. DOSTOYEVSKY, supra note 1, at 536.
275. Id.
276. Id. at 546.
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something totally unexpected. We'll completely demolish all that
psychology, I'll convert all those suspicions about you into thin air,
so that your crime will look like some kind of a brainstorm, because,
in all conscience, a brainstorm is what it was.277
At the close of this diatribe, Porfiry says, "I'm a decent
man ... and I'll keep my word." 78 After Raskolnikov responds by
telling him that he doesn't want a reduced sentence, Porfiry, who,
understanding his suspect's proclivity to augment his own
suffering, is not surprised and addresses him as much as possible
as a friend, saying "don't turn your nose up at life[, ... surrender
yourself directly to life, without circumspection ....

I simply

believe that you still have a lot of living to do yet." 79 Porfiry also
lets Raskolnikov know that he is not seriously worried about
attempted flight and that he is "certain that ... [he will] 'accept
suffering.'"'
Before they part, Raskolnikov reminds Porfiry that
he has not made "any kind of confession ... today." 8' When
Porfiry departs, he is "hunched" and apparently resigned to his
282
own limitations.
One of the enigmas of this climactic scene is why Porfiry does
not simply arrest Raskolnikov right then and there. Professor
Burnham partly attributes Porfiry's modus operandi to the law
applicable at the time of Crime and Punishment and the
requirement that "confessions be (1) voluntary, (2) consistent with
the factual circumstances of the case, and (3) judicial."" Burnham
explains the "judicial" dictates that "the confession ... be made
either in open court or in formal testimony given before an
examining magistrate during the pretrial investigation stages of
the case."'
Surely, by the time of that final interview, Raskolnikov, with
perhaps just a little cajoling, could have given a confession that
qualified as "voluntary" within the meaning of Russian law.'
In
this third investigative rendezvous, the examining magistrate
could have still met the standards, even if he gently encouraged
Raskolnikov to just get the confession over and done right then
and there. But Porfiry does not choose to proceed that way.
Why does Porfiry leave Raskolnikov to his own conscience
after suggesting that he confess, accept responsibility, and grab
the offer of leniency? To some extent Porfiry's approach in this

277.
278.
279.
280.
281.
282.
283.
284.
285.

Id. at 547.
Id.
Id. at 548-49.
Id. at 550.
Id. at 551.
Id.
Burnham, supra note 3, at 1236.
Id.
Id.
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third meeting harmonizes with the ones he employed in the
previous interviews.
Porfiry understands full well that
Raskolnikov needs and has always needed to confess. He also
intuits on another level that Raskolnikov needs that little boy
within to emerge, needs to confront the internal Mikolka-horse
beater, and needs to electively embrace life anew. Porfiry gives
Raskolnikov enough space to make crucial decisions and thus,
ensures that the confession ensues from free will instead of from
some mere inquisitorial squeezing. Porfiry understands that
voluntariness is sacrosanct and even goes so far as to accept what
the Supreme Court denied in Connelly - namely, that even when
a confession is not the product of law enforcement coercion, but
comes from an individual's inner voices or the forces of some
psychosis, it is still involuntary."
Porfiry is intent on letting
things incubate so that Raskolnikov can rationally forge his own
resolution.
Contrary to what appears to be Weisberg's view that the
examining magistrate ends up sullying what is a "perfectly
respectable professional position,"287 Porfiry is cognizant of the
importance of maintaining a fair accusatorial playing field. In this
respect, Porfiry again embodies some of the sacred policies that
undergird older United States Supreme Court confession cases particularly that constituent concern with the existence of and
appearance of fair play.'
As discussed above, the landmark Due Process confession
cases focus not just on the reliability of the extracted statements,
but on the conduct of the interrogators themselves and on the
promotion of public confidence in this country's penal system.29
Porfiry too has that "deep-rooted feeling that the police must obey
the law while enforcing the law" and that human liberty is
"endangered" by reprehensible law enforcement methods.2 9° In the
Fifth Amendment context, Miranda and its progeny clarify that
the interest in preserving public faith in our accusatory system of
justice is paramount. 9' Porfiry too understands that any
interrogation environment "carries its own badge of intimidation"
which is "destructive of human dignity."'
In the Sixth
Amendment area, the underpinning of Massiah and cases decided
in its wake is the policy of safeguarding the integrity of our
286. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157; see also supra notes 89-101 and accompanying
text (discussing Connelly and how the Court found that the coercion must
come from a state actor, not from a suspect's mental condition).
287. WEISBERG, supra note 8, at 54; see also supra notes 268-69 and
accompanying text.
288. See generally supra Part III.
289. See generally supra Part III.A.
290. Spano, 360 U.S. at 320-21.
291. See generallysupra Part III.B.
292. Miranda,384 U.S. at 457-58.

20061

The Therapeutic JurisprudenceConfession

101

adversarial justice system.293 Porfiry too believes that he, although
possessed with sufficient evidence to arrest his suspect, must
nevertheless comport his conduct with "basic dictates of
fairness."294
While Porfiry appears at least implicitly aware of the values
that the seminal Supreme Court espouses with respect to fairness
and voluntariness, his understanding is more profound and
certainly more expansive. Most significantly, in that final, more
humane interview with Raskolnikov, who is no longer his mere
circling moth, Porfiry promises a mitigated sentence and asserts
that he is a man of his word. We learn later that "Porfiry
Petrovich fully kept his promise," that he had a "decisive role in
softening the fate of the accused man," and that Raskolnikov's
sentence "turned out to be more lenient than might have been
supposed." 5
In essence, Dostoyevksy's examining magistrate implicitly
endorses one of the fundamental tenets of therapeutic
jurisprudence: namely that when individuals participate in a
judicial process, what is most important is their assessment of the
fairness of the process itself.'
When individuals feel that the
legal system has treated them with dignity and respect, the effect
is therapeutic: they are more inclined to accept responsibility for
their own conduct, take charge, and change." 7 Porfiry, who has
genuinely invested himself in his suspect and hopes to see him
"surrender... directly to life" and let "life... carry [him]
through," knows to a point of certitude that by honoring his own
promise and by treating Raskolnikov fairly, respectfully, and
mercifully, he can participate in a life-affirming rebirth.299
When at that final meeting, Porfiry assures Raskolnikov
"[hlave no fear, my good chap; we shall do things your way,""" and
gives him space and time to come clean on his own terms, Porfiry
demonstrates a grasp of what therapeutic jurisprudence scholars
tout as a prime ingredient in the recipe for healing - that sense
of voluntary participation.'
When individuals feel that they
voluntarily partake in a process that results in a judicial
pronunciation that affects their own lives, they are more likely to
mend and alter their behavior."0 ' Porfiry does not want the
confession to be voluntary just because voluntariness is a requisite

293.
294.
295.
296.
297.
298.
299.
300.
301.

See generally supra Part III.C.
Massiah, 377 U.S. at 205 (quoting Waterman, 175 N.E.2d at 448).
DOSTOYEVSKY, supra note 1, at 639.
See supra notes 22-27 and accompanying text.
Id.
DOSTOYEVSKY, supra note 1, at 548-49.
Id. at 551.
See supra notes 32-34 and accompanying text.
Id.
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under Crime and Punishment's legal code, but instead appears to
appreciate that only a purely voluntary act of coming clean will
precipitate that so needed and so desired regeneration.
At the end of this final interview, although Porfiry should
realize that the match is over, that he has "won" and that the
moth has fallen into his flame, he does not strut out like some
victorious conqueror. Rather, Porfiry retreats, "looking somehow
hunched" and even slightly diminished. "° Although hopeful that
Raskolnikov will turn himself in, "discharge the duty that justice
requires" and ultimately, let life begin anew, the examining
magistrate also sadly acquiesces in his own limitations.3" He
knows that neither he nor any prosecutorial agent are the ones
that can bring a true therapeutic triumph to fruition. He accepts
that he, as the inquisitorial officer, will always be the adversary
and that the completion of the real crowning accomplishment is
properly delegated to someone else. In real life, it is the defense
counsel's job. In Crime and Punishment,it is all up to little Sonya.
B. Sonya as Therapeutic Agent
Professor Robert Cochran's article, suggesting that "lawyer[s]
should explore the possibility of confession with a client," even
when it "might lead to public disapproval, prosecution, and/or
conviction," formulates the "moral discourse of friends" as a "model
for lawyer-client moral discourse. "3 "* Cochran feels that the
"lawyer as friend" is a better alternative to the authoritarian
model, which is "inconsistent with client dignity... and limit[s]
moral growth":0 5
The lawyer as friend engages in moral conversation with the client
but leaves decisions (including a decision such as whether to
confess) to the client. Such a lawyer seeks not to impose. She may
give her opinion, but on most issues would make it clear that she
would help the client either way. The lawyer recognizes, and tells
the client, that most issues in legal representation are issues over
which reasonable moral people can differ."°
Although Cochran does not relegate his thoughts to the genre of
therapeutic jurisprudence, he is implicitly aligned with us through
his emphasis on voice, validation, and voluntary participation. "°
Cochran, like therapeutic jurisprudence scholars, stresses that
"[tlhe greatest moral growth comes if the client chooses to confess,
rather than doing so under pressure from the lawyer," and that

302. DosToyEvsKY, supra note 1, at 551.
303. Id. at 549.
304. Cochran, supra note 9, at 334, 379.

305. Id. at 380.
306. Id. at 379-80.
307. See generally supra Part I.
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"deeper moral growth comes when we act morally in freedom, from
internal rather than external direction."3"8 Porfiry ascribes to such
a philosophy, but understands that because he, as adversary, as
the one saddled with the mission of securing the offender's arrest,
can neither be the prototypical lawyer as friend or the pressurefree progenitor of moral growth.
Throughout most of Crime and Punishment, Raskolnikov does
not interact with a lawyer of his own, and even when Dostoyevsky
gives us a redacted summary of the trial, we have no real sense of
defense counsel at work.
What Dostoyevsky does give us,
however, is Sonya, who is Raskolnikov's "advocate" (in the truest
meaning of that word).
As mentioned above, Sonya is
Marmeladov's young daughter, who has been forced into
prostitution to support her alcoholic father and his other children.
Raskolnikov, who sees in Sonya a rare goodness, is attracted to
her and also compelled to torment her. What the ex-law student
apparently detects in Sonya is her talent for self-sacrifice and her
healing qualities, along with that potential to nurture the inner
boy-Raskolnikov, the one that can leap forth to counter the inner
destructive Mikolka.
Although not literally a lawyer nor a psychologist - like it or
not Dostoyevsky's noble prostitute wins the award for
therapeutic jurisprudence professor of the year. In the first of two
salient encounters between the ex-law student and Sonya,
Raskolnikov discovers that Sonya, who is deeply religious, was a
close friend of Lizaveta, Alyona's murdered step-sister. Although
sympathetic of Sonya and her plight, Raskolnikov reminds her of
her hopelessness and even eggs her on toward suicide:
Isn't it monstrous that you're living in this filth which you hate and
loathe, while all the time you know (you have only to open your
eyes) that you're neither helping nor saving anyone by it? And, I
mean, tell me," he said in a near frenzy, "how such turpitude and
vileness can exist in you alongside these other, opposing and holy
emotions? I mean, it would be more just, a thousand times more
just, and more reasonable
to throw yourself head first in the water
39
and have done with it! 0
Sonya does not try to rebut Raskolnikov's depiction of her pathetic
life, but instead claims that God sustains her. Shortly thereafter,
Raskolnikov spots a Russian translation of the New Testament on
a chest of drawers, which, as it turns out, was Lizaveta's gift to
Sonya. Seemingly out of the blue, Raskolnikov urges Sonya to
read him "the bit about the raising of Lazarus." 1°

308. Cochran, supra note 9, at 380.
309. DOSTOYEVSKY, supra note 1, at 383.
310. Id. at 386.
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For Raskolnikov, this gospel session vaticinates his future
and eventual moral rebirth. Raskolnikov, sensing that himself,
fears that Sonya's righteousness could be "catching" and exclaims,
"I'll be turning into a holy fool myself soon ...!"" Sonya, with
"shaking" hands and chest "constricted," complies with his
command until she reaches the part, "And he that was dead came
forth," which "she read loudly and ecstatically, shaking and
shivering, as though she were seeing it in real life." 12 When
Dostoyevsky describes the candle "shedding its dim light on the
murderer and the prostitute who had so strangely encountered
each other in the reading of the eternal book," he intertwines their
futures and their souls. 1 ' Raskolnikov tells Sonya, "[ylou're all
I've got now ...so let's take the road together" and says, "You're
necessary to me, and that's why I've come to you. " " ' Before
Raskolnikov parts, he promises Sonya that if he returns to see her,
he will disclose the identity of Lizaveta's murderer:
I know and I'll tell you ....You I'll tell, and you alone! I've singled
you out. I won't come to ask you to forgive me, I'll simply tell you. I
singled you out a long time ago as the person to tell this to, I
thought of it back at the time when your father spoke about you and
when Lizaveta was still alive.1
Raskolnikov, sensing that the prostitute is his salvation and that
she will raise him, like Lazarus, from the dead, realizes that
Sonya is the one, who can release the inner boy-Raskolnikov, help
subjugate the inner-Mikolka, and be his true therapeutic agent his lawyer-friend. She will be the one to hear his confession.
As discussed above, listening skills, so intermeshed with
fairness, is something that therapeutic jurisprudence aims to
cultivate." 6 Michael D. Clark, a social worker and consultant to
drug treatment courts, advocates the use of therapeutic techniques
by all professionals (including judges, probation officers, and
lawyers) who treat offenders.317 For him, listening, along with
"perceived empathy, acceptance, warmth, and self expression" can
bring about positive behavior change.318
While, of course, no one here preposterously suggests that
Sonya is a time-traveling therapeutic jurisprudence scholar or that
somehow in mid-Nineteenth Century Russia, she became well

311. Id. at 387.
312. Id. at 388, 390.

313. Id. at 391.
314. Id.
315. Id. at 393.
316. See supra notes 28-35 and accompanying text.
317. Clark, supra note 50, at 147.

318. Id. at 140.
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versed in today's psychology of procedural justice, but the fact
remains that Sonya somehow has imbibed the wisdom that
listening, along with empathy, acceptance, and encouragement can
work miracles - can raise a soul from the dead. It is Sonya, who
intuits how to empower Raskolnikov with voice, validation, and
voluntary participation. In their next significant encounter, Sonya
hears Raskolnikov's confession and in the process of doing so,
exhibits therapeutic virtuosity.
Feeling that he "must" confess to Sonya and that he could not
put it off any longer, Raskolnikov keeps his promise and discloses
Lizaveta's murderer.319
But, rather than just owning up,
Raskolnikov begins by describing the crime in third person, "[hie
didn't mean... to kill Lizaveta ....
He killed her by accident. He
meant to kill the old woman." 2
After listening intently and
insisting that she is unable to guess the identity of the murderer,
Sonya gives him space and an opportunity to come clean.
Once Sonya realizes the truth, she does not shun Raskolnikov
or judge him, but rather "move[s] towards him , . . . seize[s] both
his hands" and then "thr[ows] herself on his neck, embracing him
and gripping him as hard as she could in her arms."321 Her body
language connotes empathy and acceptance and shows that she
possesses that rare talent of being able to separate her love for
another being from his horrific behavior. Raskolnikov himself
points that out when he exclaims: "You put your arms round me
322
and kiss me after I've told you a thing like that."
When
Raskolnikov accuses her of not knowing "what [she] [is] about,"
Sonya makes it clear that she hears him and knows exactly what
she and he are all about:31 she tells Raskolnikov, "There's no one,
no one in the whole world more unhappy than you are now.
What Sonya feels is the torment of both the whipped horse
and the inner little-boy Raskolnikov, who has been suppressed by
the inner-Mikolka.
Understanding his agonizing sense of
isolation, Sonya promises him, "I'll never leave you, no matter
where you go! ... I'll follow you everywhere."2 5 Through this,
Sonya intimates that if he decides to do what he needs to do - to
confess and accept responsibility - that he will not be alone. In
essence, this is Sonya gently urging him to find the course that is
right for him and also instilling in him at least a modicum of hope.

319. DOSTOYEVSKY, supra note 1, at 485.
320.
321.
322.
323.
324.
325.

Id. at 489.
Id. at 490, 491.
Id. at 491.
Id.
Id.
Id.

The John MarshallLaw Review

[40:41

Cochran,
discussing "lawyer as friend," asks us to imagine
26

3

that:

[A] close friend comes to you and confesses that he has embezzled
something from his employer. You are likely neither to push your
friend to confess, nor to ignore the wrong that your friend has done.
You are likely to try to help your friend think through the matter.
You might offer an opinion, but you would be likely to do so in a
tentative fashion, respecting the dignity of your friend.2 7
Sonya, who does not pressure, order, or dominate, becomes the
friend destined to hear the balm of confession. While Sonya does
not try to push Raskolnikov, she does not deny the offense, but
tentatively suggests that he accept responsibility, and even offers
to accompany him to Siberia so that they can "do penal servitude
together."32 When he indicates that he may not yet be ready to
accept that, Sonya neither coerces nor nags, but rather engages
him in further dialogue about the murder.
What ensues is
possibly the most therapeutic event in Raskolnikov's entire life.
Sonya gently encourages him to discuss or test out his
putative motives for the crime. when he contends that his motives
were monetary, Sonya doubtingly asks, "Who could ever bring
himself to believe it? .... And how, how could you give away the
last copeck you had, yet murder someone in order to rob her?"3"
Like a true therapeutic jurisprudence pro, "[w]ith her whole
attention, Sonya listen[s]" until Raskolnikov extracts self-truth's
kernel, "if the only reason I'd 330killed her was because I was
hungry ...I'd be. . . happy now."
From there, he takes another stab at it, imploring her to
indulge him in his Napoleonic theory, and after listening, she tells
him, "go on, go on ...I will understand, I'll understand it in my
own way.""' Her attentiveness induces Raskolnikov to speak the
truth, "[aictually, all of what I've been telling you is nonsense,
almost pure drivel." It is at that juncture, that Raskolnikov, now
an amalgam of friend-client-patient, does what he always seems to
do in a pinch: namely, exile himself from the species and
dehumanize his victim. He tests this out on Sonya by protesting,
"Look, Sonya, all I killed was a louse a loathsome, useless,
harmful louse!"" And Sonya responds "But that louse was a
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human being!"3 " From there, we detect the incipience of
rehabilitative potential: it is here that Raskolnikov concedes that
Alyona "wasn't really a louse," that he is "talking nonsense," and
that his justification is plain "wrong.""' Eventually, he admits, "I
simply killed; I killed for my own sake, for no one but myself' and
in so doing, implies that the crime was a cataclysm precipitating
self-transformation.3"' Such candor embryonically prefigures what
is to come - the post-confession Raskolnikov, who renounces his
lies, accepts responsibility, and births himself anew.
When Sonya observes Raskolnikov recoiling into "a kind of
black ecstasy" and "realize[s] that this black catechesis had
become his creed and his law," she directs him to consider a power
bigger then himself and tells him, 'You've strayed away from
God... .""' When he explains that he had "wanted to kill without
casuistry," and begs her for advice, she admonishes that
"casuistry" is not and can not be evaded. 3 8 Sensing that conflicted
Raskolnikov seeks both to divorce the consequences of his own
actions and also to court merited self-flagellation, Sonya advises
him to dash out in front of the crowd, assail the horse-whipping
Mikolka inside, and come clean in a very big public way:
Go immediately, this very moment, go and stand at the crossroads,
bow down, first kiss the ground that you've desecrated, and then
bow to the whole world, to all four points of the compass and tell
everyone, out loud: "I have killed!" Then God will send you life
again.3 39
Sonya does not counsel self-deception, silence, hiding, or sham
rationalizations, but instead prescribes an elixir vitae in the form
of redemptive suffering. When Raskolnikov initially rejects the
remedy, she does not push, but merely asks, "But how will you
live?... How will life be possible for you now?"' ° She has truly
heard Raskolnikov and does what therapeutic jurisprudence
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scholars advise - namely, the technique of "reflective listening,"
which is a way of periodically checking the accuracy of what the
listener believes that the client has said. 41
Sonya helps
Raskolnikov explore the ramifications of his self-destructive
course
3 42
and warns, "Oh, how you'll suffer, how you'll suffer!"
Michael Clark, discussing ways to convey hope in dealing
with offenders, suggests creating what he calls "a second door" by
just "allowing conflicting feelings and conditions to exist."3" He
explains by way of example that "[a] client could feel scared and
hopeless about his ability to begin abstinence from drugs and yet
marshal the confidence to avoid using 'just for today.'"3 " It is
apparent that Sonya in an intuitive way carves out a "second
door." Although Raskolnikov is not yet willing to confess and
surrender to exile in Siberia, he is nevertheless able to "marshal"
the gumption to spend just a little time in jail. He tells Sonya that
"[t]here's no way I can avoid them putting me in jail .... But
that's nothing ...I'll do a little time and then they'll let me out
again."14' Raskolnikov, of course, still in denial and also embroiled
in his internecine war, invites Sonya to visit him in jail and' then
ipse dixit orders her to stay away. But when Raskolnikov parts,
there is a sense that this "lawyer as friend" has ignited some
healing and that the future might bring hope and salvation.'
Raskolnikov agrees to let Sonya give him one of her crosses to
wear at a later time so that they can "bear [their] crosses together"
and "pray and take the road together." 7
It is also apparent that Sonya's therapeutic work is there but
dormant in Raskolnikov's psyche when he later evaluates and
rejects the lethal solution that Svidrigailov has chosen for
himself.3"
Svidrigailov, sister Dunya's former employer and
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rejected suitor, ultimately takes his own life. But before doing so,
Svidrigailov confesses to Raskolnikov, narrating his lecherous life
story replete with multiple offenses against women and young
girls.349
While Raskolnikov realizes that Svidrigailov's inner
torment parallels his own, he repudiates that alternative of suicide
and instead marches off to the police station to abide by Sonya's
more life affirming antidote.5 0 As such, while Sonya's moral
discourse with Raskolnikov did not have an immediate effect, it
prepared him to evaluate options and freely choose confession."'
Professor Wexler, analyzing the rehabilitative role of the
criminal defense lawyer, explains that the therapeutic
jurisprudence switch does not just shut off with a confession or a
conviction and sentence.352 For "a client... confronting an
incarcerative sentence, the [Therapeutic Jurisprudence] criminal
lawyer should, at some point, engage the client in a dialogue
regarding the sentence and the future." As Wexler suggests, the
relationship between attorney and client is ongoing, and even
during
and
after incarceration,
there
are therapeutic
opportunities, like discussing an "expected or hoped-for release or
conditional release date" or assisting in the process of reentry and
readjustment. " As such, the bond between the therapeutic lawyer
and client is ongoing.
Significantly, in Crime and Punishment, Sonya's service as
therapeutic agent continues even after Raskolnikov is convicted
and sent to Siberia. Like Porfiry, Sonya keeps her promises: she
physically accompanies Raskolnikov to Siberia and whenever
possible stands by his side or foists herself in his range of vision.
While initially other prisoners detest Raskolnikov, who is plagued
by a "terrible and impassable abyss that lay between himself and
[the others]," it is Sonya who builds the only conceivable bridge
between the ex-law student and his new society.355 As the author
explains, the other prisoners, who had "all taken such a liking to
Sonya, knew that she had followed him [Raskolnikov]" and they
nevertheless came to be "on rather closer terms with [her].""' As

Svidrigailov is the most explicit 'double'; he floats into the action as if he were
part of Raskolnikov's mind").

349. Id. at 44 (discussing Svidrigailov's "sexual depravity" and describing
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discussed below, her tenacity eventually pays off because Sonya's
therapeutic mission of engendering Raskolnikov's transformation
is ultimately consummated.
VI. CONCLUSION

Crime and Punishment, one of the great classics of world
literature, introduces us to the role of confession in the criminal
justice system. As discussed above, Dostoyevsky's novel has an
affinity with the seminal United States Supreme Court confession
cases under the Due Process Clause and Fifth and Sixth
Amendments. Dostoyevsky, like the Supreme Court, expresses
concern with the crucial distinction between a voluntary and a
coerced confession.
He, also like our Court, believes in
safeguarding public confidence in a nation's penal system.
As discussed above, Crime and Punishment, nicely annexed to
a relatively new movement called therapeutic jurisprudence,
shows how the law can "function as a kind of therapist or
therapeutic
agent."357 Dostoyevsky,
like
the therapeutic
jurisprudence scholars, agrees that the legal system should cater
to the goal of healing and promoting individual well being. This
great Russian author, who himself endured hard labor and exile in
Siberia, understood full well that an individual's voluntary
participation in what is experienced as a fair process is and should
be the veritable goal of criminal justice.
Crime and Punishment is a misnomer because it is not really
about crime or even about punishment per se, but its real subject
is one human being's overwhelming need to come clean.
Raskolnikov probably could have escaped detection and gotten
away with the murder, but he himself effectually sabotages such
possibility. Even before the crime, anguished Raskolnikov is
obsessed with confession; during the crime, he makes enough
mistakes to conceivably betray himself and instigate his own
confession; and after the crime, Raskolnikov is compelled to do
himself in by revisiting the crime scene, by making incriminating
remarks to the police in a bar, and by playing "cat and mouse"
games with his formidable nemesis, Porfiry Petrovich.
In the novel, confession mutates into a celebrated event. As
Porfiry and Sonya understand, confession is not just a
prosecutorial tool for closing a crime file, but is and can be the very
catalyst to healing and rehabilitation. Dostoyevsky delivers his
lessons in therapeutic jurisprudence partially through Porfiry,
who tries as best he can to not coerce, but rather encourage, a
confession that comes as close as is possible to a true act of free
will.
But Porfiry grasps his own limitations as examining
magistrate, as Raskolnikov's adversary in the criminal justice
357. Winick, supra note 13.
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system, and knows what our Supreme Court once espoused in
Miranda: namely, that custodial interrogation is inherently
coercive." Porfiry understands that he can merely aspire to elicit
what he can never really attain - the therapeutic confession.
According to a whole body of therapeutic jurisprudence
scholarship, when individuals believe that they have been
genuinely listened to, heard, and taken seriously, they feel
validated.359 When such individuals emerge with a sense of voice
and validation, they are more accepting of the outcome." ° Further,
voice and validation foster a sense of voluntary participation,
which helps the individual experience the proceedings as less
coercive.36' Such scholars and other proponents of social justice
believe that when individuals feel that they voluntarily participate
in a process that ends in a judicial decree that affects their own
lives, they tend to heal better and even alter destructive behavior
patterns.362
In therapeutic jurisprudence, the attorney is key - it is he or
she who can help give clients that sense of voice, validation, and
voluntary participation.3" In Crime and Punishment, Sonya, a
non-lawyer, performs that therapeutic role for Raskolnikov.
Dostoyevsky shows how Sonya uses "reflective listening," to give
Raskolnikov voice and validation.3" Sonya also helps to effectuate
Raskolnikov's participatory interests, encourages what he so
desperately needs - that voluntary act of confession - and leads
him to accept responsibility for his own actions.
As pointed out above, while principles of therapeutic
jurisprudence are now operating in many areas of the law, there
are criminal defense attorneys that have built an actual
therapeutic jurisprudence practice."'
Others, who are more
traditional, have woven therapeutic jurisprudence wisdom into
their work.3" Therapeutic jurisprudence can also give us a new
perspective on client confession and help dispel what Cochran has
denominated the "authoritarian model," which impugns "client
dignity" and suffocates "moral growth."367
Criminal defense
attorneys can cultivate the Sonyaesque skills, which can induce
healing.
When Raskolnikov first arrives in Siberia, he is still a
tortured soul: he feels "no remorse for his crime," heaps abuse on
358.
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Sonya, treating her with "scornful and crudely insulting behavior,"
and alienates himself from the other convicts who "dislike[U him
and avoid[] him" and "even gr[ow] to hate him."' Raskolnikov is
further both perplexed and tormented by the fact that the very
convicts that want to "hurl [themselves] at him in a state of rabid
fury, 369 are enchanted with Sonya:
She would smile and greet them back, and they all loved it when she
smiled at them. They were even fond of her manner of walking, and
would turn round to look after her as she went on her way, passing
appreciative comments about her; they often made such comments
in connection with her being so small, and indeed could not find
enough good things to say about her. They went to see her when
they were ill, and she would tend to them.37 °
In Siberia, while Sonya functions as healing agent for the prison
population, Raskolnikov remains the proverbial outcast, the exile
in exile.
But eventually Raskolnikov transforms. It occurs shortly
after an illness, when he dreams in the prison hospital that the
whole world is afflicted with "some strange, unheard of and
unprecedented plague" and that entire populations are going mad
and "kill[ing] one another in a kind of senseless anger."3 71 The
symptoms resemble Raskolnikov's mental state - his self-imposed
isolation and his hubristic claim to superiority. That is, under the
aegis of such infection, "no one could understand anyone
else ... [and] each person thought that he alone possessed the
truth."3 7' After practically everything is destroyed, there are a
chosen few that escape to "usher in a new life, to renew the earth
and render it pure."373
Through the dream, Raskolnikov,
welcoming a Lazarus-like renewal, hails the emergence of the
inner boy Raskolnikov, who can squelch that rabid mare-beating
Mikolka within.
After Raskolnikov recuperates from his own illness, we detect
changes. Apparently, for the first time truly cognizant of another
human being, Raskolnikov actually notices that he hasn't seen
Sonya in quite a while. He is even worried about someone other
than himself, and realizing that he is "waiting for her with anxious
concern," seeks to ascertain her condition. 4 When Sonya, who
was ill, learns that Raskolnikov "was so dejected and worried for
her sake," she sends him a note that stirs emotion, making "his
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heart beat violently and painfully." 75 Raskolnikov is beginning to
feel, to actually care for another human being. After Sonya
recovers and meets Raskolnikov again, "he [is] hurled to her feet,"
and ends up weeping and hugging her knees."6
This moment is the milestone and Sonya knows it: "[hIer eyes
beg[in] to shine with infinite happiness" and she is "in no doubt
that at last it had arrived," and that he "loves her infinitely."3"
Raskolnikov similarly knows that he has "recovered... completely
with the whole of his renewed being." 78 Raskolnikov relinquishes
"those torments of the past," opens up the New Testament, begins
to plan his future with Sonya, and even reconnects with the
human race. Dostoyevsky informs us that "all the convicts, his
former enemies, now looked upon him differently" and that "[hie
had actually began to talk to them, and they had replied to him in
kindly tones." 9 As such, Raskolnikov's voluntary therapeutic
confession catalyzes what Dostoyevsky depicts as a "new
story.., of a man's gradual renewal, his gradual rebirth, his
gradual transition from one world to another."38 ' Raskolnikov's
voluntary acceptance of responsibility within a penal system that
ultimately treated him fairly and mercifully helps him and us
make some sense out of a senseless brutal crime.
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